
The Heisenberg-Bohr tranquilizing philosophy--or religion?--is so delicately contrived that, for the time being,
it provides a gentle pillow for the true believer
from which he cannot very easily be aroused.
So let him lie there.
Albert Einstein

A quantum interpretation of signifier and signified
G.
Globus <GGGlobus@uci.edu> (360 San Miguel Dr., Ste. 603, Newport Beach,
CA 92660 , USA.)
The `unity' of signifier and signified in the sign is evident, yet mysterious.How are these terms defined? I think I know what he means but I am uncertain.
A category problem seems to arise, since marks on the material page are unlike immaterial meanings.OK
Quantum brain theory permits development of a quantum interpretation of meaning which sheds light on this problem.I hope so. I tend to think of "meaning" as the invariant structure in a group (or semigroup or maybe something more general from category theory) of transformations of sensory data mapped by back-action into the quantum pilot "qualia" wave of the brain.
The meanings which each individual brings to the interaction with reality are quantum physical: superpositions in quantum fields hoisted by brain biosubstrates.What does this mean? Is "hoisted" a typo? Should it be "hosted"? In my theory the quantum pilot qualia wave is attached to brain biosubstrates, so the term "hosted" would fit.
(See the books by Umezawa [1993] on quantum field theory and Jibu and Yasue [1995] on quantum brain dynamics, from which a quantum theory of meaning can be derived.) But now a new problem arises: Meaning is quantum physical, whereas signifiers are perfectly classical. If there is to be a `unity' between signified and signifier, we have to deal with the relation between quantum and classical domains, which still vexes quantum physics enormously (the `measurement problem').Yes, but the problem is only in the Bohr-type epsistemological interpretations not in Bohm's ontological interpretation which I use. It is superior for this mind-matter problem. Everything can be visualized clearly the way Feynman diagrams are an advantage over the old second-quantized operator methods.
With the advent of quantum neurophysics, however, everything changes; a quantum theory of perception of classical objects can now be developed which breaks new ground. Perception occurs where quantum cognition (a de Broglie-like phase wave), quantum memory (in the vacuum states of ordered water, according to Jibu and Yasue) and the quantum representative of reality (Frohlich condensates) meet.In my mental pilot wave theory, perception is the change in the pilot wave due to back-action of the change in the material brain substrate indiced by sensory data. Ordered water is actually the quieting or damping of thermal fluctuations by the quantum-Carnot engine process in which the negative temperature of the pumped Frohlich modes couples the positive temperature of the random collisions of the water molecules and coheres them performing useful coherent electrochemical work in the process.
In the wave interference, when a match is made between quantum cognition/memory and quantum reality, a classical order occurs.Is there a more detailed model of this? I don't understand this claim.
Perception of the quotidian world continually unfolds out of quantum field interactions. The signifier is the product of the quantum field interaction between representatives of sensory input and superposed symbols of the particular language. The brain brings to the interaction with sensory input a superposition of the letters of the alphabet, and depending on what sensory input specifically brings to the match, there is perception of a particular letter or string.Interesting intuitive images- but is there some definite math model for this?
At the same time, a different process is going on. In the past, a particular arbitrary pattern of sensory input has convolved with certain superposed meanings and the convolution stored as a memory trace."Convolved" in spacetime? -- so that the Fourier (or maybe wavelet) transform of the convolution is the product of the separate transforms? Why? What is the physical mechanism of the memory trace? It sounds as if you think of "meanings" as "eigenfunctions" of some operator? Clearly we experience superposed meanings especially in art, music and poetry, so I sort of see where you are coming from-- but is this more than just interesting verbal images which may correctly point to a future theory, or is the theory here-now?
Now when that arbitrary sensory pattern recurs, the superposed meanings are evoked (and vice versa).That feels on the right track, but is there any math to back it up?
So a sensory pattern comes in, and two things happen: symbols are perceived and meanings are evoked, simultaneously. (There is much empirical evidence that under special conditions, the meaning can be evoked without perception of the pattern, as in blindsight.) This simultaneity is the `unity' of the sign; the signifier is unfolded at the same time that the signified is evoked, in the interaction with reality. The sign on a quantum interpretation thus has remarkable properties: it is the noncausal relation (by simultaneity) between an arbitrary signifier and a quantum.Again is there a math model for this, or is it only an evocative interesting metaphorical functional verbal model? Is there anything beyond the above words?
A quantum link to consciousness
D.W. Miller (106 St.
Marks Ave., Prospect Heights, Brooklyn, NY 11217, USA.)
Conflicting claims and mutual rejection of data by protagonists for science and consciousness could be diminished by acceptance of a common conceptual foundation.This is not possible today because of the paradigm war today over the differing interpretations of quantum mechanics which started with the Einstein-Bohr debate that still rages on where the advocates of Bohm's pilot wave have replaced Einstein.
A common foundation is available through higher level, organizing factors affecting quantum physics, and consciousness. This factor is introduced in physics by the collapse of the Schroedinger wave function, whose dynamics can be applied to consciousness as well.Remember there is no "collapse" in Bohm's pilot wave theory. Therefore, "collapse" is not the starting point for a "common foundation". What exactly is the "higher level, organizing factor"? I doubt you can precisely model it in the Bohr epistemic approach used by Stapp. It is precisely modeled in the ontological Bohm pilot wave theory as the back-action of matter (i.e. both source particles and gauge force fields) in spacetime on their attached mental pilot waves in the Hilbert space fibers beyond spacetime which is the "base space". The back-action, together with the quantum force of pilot wave on matter (the brain substrate of Globus above) completes a feedback control loop between brain matter and mind quantum pilot wave that is the organizing factor. This shows up as the quantum friction term in the Nanopoulos bottom-up "brains with strings attached" theory, and it is of same mathematical form as the top-down self-organizing term of Prigogine's thermodynamics of dissipative systems.
Note, if you have Amber plug in for Netscape 2.0 or Adobe Acrobat you can see metaphorical pictures of the Hilbert space fibers beyond spacetime in epr.pdf. Caution, if you do this now you will jump out of the closed hypertext loops-within-loops of this section, so use your back button on your web browser to jump back in this labyrinth in cyberspace.
Several theories have been proposed, but Stapp (1993) and Miller (1993) have suggested that this common denominator is the selectivity factor making choice a causal factor in determining reality.How do you mathematically model this all-important "selectivity factor" without violating the Born probability rule of orthodox quantum mechanics. Stapp says it is possible but is vague about it. My back-action pilot wave theory has the selctivity factor as the feedback-control loop between brain and its attached pilotwave mind, but this violates the Born rule in accord with the ideas of Josephson and Valentini. Stapp indicated some sort of boundary condition manipulation of the Hamiltonian. So you need a environmentally-coupled context-dependent Hamiltonian that is constantly self-modifying itself in some way that Stapp is never sufficiently explicity about. I bet when you do this in detail it will be a back-action theory that violates orthodox quantum thoery like Stapp did in Physical Review A, July 1994 p.18. I am not convicned that Stapp is not contradicting himself when he claims he can get choice out of quantum chance in the orthodox Bohr theory. If you know how to do this please demonstrate it in detail with math.
In all systems, Miller includes the additional qualification of homeostasis operating conjointly with selectivity to determine choices.What does this mean?
Both quantum physics and consciousness depend on specifically collated events in their own particular systems contributing to the selection process.The only selection process I know of in orthodox quantum mechanics is the Born rule |(psi|x)|^2. How does this give anything other than the usual quantum randomsness. Looks like no free-will here. Stapp seems to say that free will will change the initial superposition, i.e., sum over x of |x)(x|psi) to a definite |x7) which is desired or "chosen" by the "self". This demands a change in the Hamiltonian of the brain. How is that done?
In the case of quantum physics the statistical, mathematical provision for a collapse of the Schroedinger wave function from a menu potential of `x' number of possibilities into a choice, say of `x7', is what makes an empirical fact appear on the dinner plate of the experimenter.This is too vague to be useful.
In the case of consciousness, Stapp thinks there is an isomorphic relationship between brain functions and consciousness that follow the wave function model.I have this precisely modeled above in my back-action pilot wave theory, but it demands a violation of orthodox quantum theory and there is no "collapse".
Miller's theory adds the observation that in the psychophysical dimension, the collapse from x possibilities is directed by survival needs linked to memory and homeostasis providing a feedback system that leads to (all things considered) the best available choice for the maintenance of survival.Good, but how do you define the "feedback system"? I have solved that problem, but it requires violating orthodox quantum theory and you do not need "collapse". There is a theorem by Bohm that such a feedback system must violate the Born probability rule.
That idea may be easier to relate to consciousness than to the quantum, but in a `separate but equal' formulation regarding mind and body, mental and physical systems. Miller describes how it can apply to both systems. The central, organizing factor in Miller's theory is homeostasis.What is "homeostasis". It seems you have left the bottom-up game of physics and are doing some top-down phenomenology using verbal metaphors like they do in "cargo cult" cognitive science. You are beginning to "mix apples with oranges" as they say. You have confused two different methodologies with different rules without providing a logical bridge to connect them.
What homeostasis contributes is to seek out a balancing of pressures and possibilities that exists whenever a potential for a selection is at hand. It works in tandem with survival (in evolution it serves to bring about the best fit between internal and external pressures and needs), through feedback and mnemonic, and mnemonic-type processes native to any system, whether it is inorganic or organic in its own structure. The Homeostatic Principle thus applies to both mechanical and biological systems, to the locally physical, and spacio-temporally cosmic as well as to the conscious aspects of our universe as we know it. Here, in this presentation, we will be limited to a discussion of how homeostasis helps create the link of selectivity in the operations of mind and body as well as of consciousness and quantum physics.
Sounds too good to be true! :-) Please show the details. Great! -- if you really have done it?
A theory of subjectivity and a natural interpretation of the
quantum psi-function
In the first half of this paper we propose a mathematically precise theory of mind.Wow! This I would like to see in detail.
We start with 1) the broader and more fundamental question of internal or subjective states -- conscious states being a formal subset of these. 2) We use common-sense (with medical) arguments to narrow down an explicit class of physical objects which can have subjective experiences (as my physical brain is in this class, and it is the class of all `internally experiencing' objects).OK, so far.
3) We end up with an explicit class of physical objects (a particular notion of system) with a characteristic transformation (systemic transformations), the transformation corresponding to a particular object experiencing subjectively, from which a testable and mathematically precise theory of subjectivity is developed.How is this "transformation" related to fundamental physical features in the sense of David Chalmer's thesis? In my case it is the already well-established bottom-up quantum pilot wave of Bohm's version of quantum mechanics. It looks like what you are doing is another top-down black box functional phenomenlogy not anchored to theoretical physics.
Allied with this we prove the following theorem: The Logic of Sensations is a Quantum Logic (essentially mapping sensations to a non-distributive orthomodular lattice).This is an interesting remark. It is probably a true remark. I have often thought of it myself. However, I doubt that you have "proved" it in any deep sense. It comes from your "transformation" which is not well defined physically. So really what you are doing is making a postulate not a proof. Note, however, in my theory, from the postulate that the quantum pilot wave of the relevant brain substrate (maybe microtubules) is a wave of qualia, it immediately follows that qualia obey quantum logic - which is an obvious fact of experience as already noted by Niels Bohr and by David Bohm in his classic Copenhagen book, The Quantum Theory.
Thus, there is an intimate connection between subjective experience (sensations) and quantum mathematics.I agree with that, but not for the reasons you give. You need to give a lot more detail on this "transformation".
A further example of the mathematical development is the (new) notion of qualimorphism: there is a qualimorphism between two brains if their physical `objective' behaviour can be mapped such that the internal subjective experience of both is the same (under the mapping.)OK as a formal remark. It is not clear that it can be tested. In my pilot wave theory it may be testable using the well defined "quantum teleportation" effect from the quantum cryptography group at IBM>
Our theory of subjectivity is seen to provide a natural interpretation of quantum mechanics (though in a sense `opposite' to the ideas of Penrose, Stapp, Lockwood, et al.). Starting from Wigner's friend, the Schr'dinger equation, and notions of relative superposition, we arrive at a natural interpretation of the quantum"relative superposition"? You mean you have a many-worlds "relative state" model with no "collapse"? I can't follow the rest of the above. I don't need a new kind of "meta-physical reality". The Hilbert space of orthodox quantum mechanics supplemented by the new "back-action" term in the destiny-matrix evolution equations of the mind are good enough. You get a lot more bang for the buck in the pilot-wave theory and do not have to introduce ad-hoc new realities. There is no need for EY -function motivated independently of, but consistent with, the above theorem. Without going into the arguments we note that: 1) what I perceive is partially dependent on my own perception-apparatus (body & brain.) 2) what is quantum-mechanically measured is partially dependent on the perception-apparatus (experimental arrangement.) 3) having denoted the world of sensations E 2, and the world of physical objects E 1, we propose the existence of a meta-physical reality E 0, which stands in the same relation to E 1 as E 1 does to E 2. This explains why physical reality is `quantum' (because it is the sensations of a still more objective kind of reality) and it is explicitly shown how this dissolves the quantum paradoxes.
I
n the manuscript we outline what this means for field theory and gravity, which essentially becomes associated with large-scale thermal fluctuations in EIn the Sakharov theory, gravity is from the quantum foam fluctuations in spacetime. Superstring theory already gives classical general relativity in the low-energy limit.0, i.e., the zero-point field.
We have a hypothesis as to why systems with certain kinds of transformations have subjective or internal experiences. It is work-in-progress, but we hope to have rigorously proved that the idea is necessarily the correct one by April.Well let's see what this "transformation" of yours is in detail.
An answer to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen?
B. Smith <barry@bluesky.
com> (Blue Sky Research, 534 SW Third Avenue, Portland, Oregon 97204,
USA)
The 1935 Physical Review paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (hence EPR) asks the explicit question: is the quantum theory complete?The correct answer is NO.
T
he EPR authors' definition of completeness also raises the experimental question: are the non-local correlations implied by the quantum theory real?The correct answer is YES. (e.g., the Aspect experiment on photon pairs.)
Finally, the closing paragraph of EPR implies the deeper question: is there a more detailed, non-statistical physical theory that explains the statistical observations of quantum mechanics?The correct answer is YES. It is Bohm's 1952 pilot wave theory that extends the more primitive theory of Prince Louis DeBroglie from the 1920's.
This paper supports an affirmative answer to each of these questionsThen, your paper is wrong.
by offering a physical model wherein local statistics are shown to be the necessary result of measurements within a non-random quantum-universe.If by "local statistics" you mean the Born probability rule, then you are wrong. That rule requires a random quantum-universe.
Can quantum mechanics dispense with the observer?
D. Hodgson
(Supreme Court of New South Wales, Queens Square, Sydney, NSW, 2000,
Australia)
The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) presupposes the existence of observers, and so can be taken as suggesting that mind and matter are interdependent, as well as suggesting that the world is partially indeterministic. The two main theories currently proposed to dispense with observers are the many-worlds or many-histories theory, and Bohm's hidden variables theory. In this paper, I argue that the former is wholly untenable, by reason of its inability to make sense of quantum-mechanical probabilities, even in apparently plausible versions such as those of Lockwood and Gell-Mann.Yes, E.J. Squires at this conference says the same thing you do. This also refutes Gell-Mann's quantum ideas in his popular book, The Quark and The Jaguar.
I also argue that Bell's theorem and the Aspect experiments show that Bohm's theory does not in fact avoid the measurement problem and thereby do away with the need for observers.I need to see this in detail.
The paper concludes by contending that, accordingly, the possibility that mind and matter are interdependent needs to be taken seriously.Indeed, in my theory mind is the Bohm quantum pilot wave which exerts a nonlocal context-dependent quantum force on the brain-matter it is attached to according to the quantum Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Non-unitary back-action of brain-matter (generated from sensory input) on its nonlocal context-dependent mental pilot wave induces qualia. The resultant creative feed-back control loop between mental pilot wave and its brain-matter enables morally responsible free will which violates the Born probability rule of orthodox quantum theory.
Chance, choice, and consciousness: a causal quantum theory
of the mind/brain
H.P. Stapp (Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University
of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA.)
Classical mechanics is dynamically complete, but entails neither the existence of, nor conditions for the emergence of, the experiential aspects of nature that comprise the phenomenal world that underlies science.I agree with this and it shows why Dan Dennett, William Calvin and Francis Crick and Pat Churchland are fundamentally wrong in their shared consciousness paradigm.
It is argued that this deficiency renders the theory unfit for extension to the domain where consciousness becomes important."Unfit" indeed! Here, here. I second that Mr. Speaker. :-)
On the other hand, quantum mechanics, in the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation, and also in its ontologicalization by von Neumann and Wigner, introduces conscious experiences into physical theory as primitive elements, and ties these elements in a specific and causally efficacious way into the quantum mechanical analog of the physical world of classical mechanics.Yes. That is a historically accurate description of the Copenhageners. I assume Stapp means "collapse" in accord with the nonunitary von Neumann projection postulate and the Born probability rule.
The form of this connection, coupled with standard ideas from neuroscience, suggests a particular kind of interplay between the experiential and physical aspects of the mind/brain system. Ways in which this dynamical interplay would enhance survival prospects of the biological system are described. A specific quantum model of the mind/brain is set up. Within this mathematical model the possibility is explored that the element of chance that occurs in orthodox quantum theory is not primitive, but masks a causal dependence upon experiential aspects of nature.Well this is much more clear than my discussions with Stapp. I agree with the above remark in the sense that his words "at the element of chance that occurs in orthodox quantum theory is not primitive, but masks a causal dependence upon experiential aspects of nature" corresponds to my "back-action", to Nanopoulos's "quantum string-foam friction", to Valentini's "non-thermal distribution of nonlocal hidden variables" and to Josephson's central intuitive idea that all biological organisms use quantum nonlocality in a way that evades the Born probability rule and Eberhard's theorem. What I do not understand in Stapp's theory is how he can possibly get "choice" (i.e., "intent", "responsible free will") and still kep the Born probability rule. This, to me appears to be a contradiction unless he uses a self-adaptive plastic brain Hamiltonian which requires a level of detailed modeling he does not seem to provide. The specific model he did provide (Phys. Rev A, July 1994, p.18) contradicted the Born rule--if I am not mistaken?
These aspects are represented in a mathematically well defined way in the Hilbert space of quantum possibilities.I hope so. But I have my doubts.
Consciousness and the non collapse of the wave function
M.L.
Smith <MIGUEL@ucrac1.ucr.edu> (Dept. of Philosophy, University of
California, Riverside, CA 92521, USA.)
The Schroedinger equation which governs the time evolution of quantum mechanical systems in the absence of measurement interactions is a linear differential equation whose solutions deterministically yield superpositions of eigenvalues of quantum mechanical observables.Correction, replace "eigenvalues" by "eigenfunctions".
However, we do not read off superpositions of results from our measurement devices, and it seems that no one even begins to know what it would be like to observe a macroscopic object in a superposition of eigenstates.NO! We know what it would be like for mesoscopic systems from the work of Tony Leggett et-al. Also David Albert has presented a thought-experiment on "photographing other worlds" which tells what it is like under conditions of self-measurement.
And as human beings are a particular kind of macroscopic object, we ought to find ourselves as being in a superposition of eigenstates, if the time evolution of our physical state is correctly given by the linear equations of motion.It is not for the Nanopulos extension of orthodox quantum mechanics for large numbers of coupled particles. In fact Nanopoulos is able to derive Avogadroe's number from from the bottom-up using string theory and standard model of quarks, leptons and gauge bosons.
Thus, the presence of Von Neumann's collapse postulate in the canonical quantum mechanical formalism does indeed look necessary to ensure the empirical adequacy of quantum mechanical predictions. Nonetheless, David Z. Albert has argued that the linear dynamics unsupplemented with the collapse postulate do in fact predict that although an observer will end up at the conclusion of a measurement interaction being in a superposition of eigenstates, the same observer will continue to believe that a perfectly ordinary and definite result has been obtained upon measurement of the object system. Thus, it is no objection against an Everett-inspired `no collapse' version of quantum mechanics that our experience of definite measurement outcomes seems inconsistent with our actually being in a superposition of eigenstates. If Albert is correct, the experience of being in a superposition should feel just like that of the experience of obtaining a definite result upon measurement.You have not adequately described Albert's ideas here because, as I already indicated, he also shows that there are special circumstances when different copies of the observer can measure their relative phase difference in parallel universes. In contrast, in Bohm's pilot wave theory there is only one actual material observer attached to one simultaneous eigenfunction in the coherent expansion of the mental pilot wave for a given complete set of commuting observables.
But Jeffrey A. Barrett demurs. He argues that while it may be that, mathematically speaking, the unsupplemented linear dynamics ensure that the observer always believes that he obtains a definite result upon measurement, the lack of any definite measurement outcome in a certain kind of thought experiment is inconsistent with the purported truth of the claim that the linear dynamics alone can tell the whole story of the time evolution of the physical world. I argue that Barrett's `dangerous measurement problem' is no problem at all for an Everett-inspired `no collapse' version of QM, so long as we agree that, (1) the observer's brain, like the rest of the observer's body, is a composite entity, whose physical states subvene on belief states such as `experiencing a definite result upon measure.
Consciousness and time reversal
G. Vitiello <vitiello
@vaxsa.csied.unisa.it> (Dipartimento di Fisica, Universita' di Salerno,
84100 Salerno, Italia)
In the framework of Dissipative Quantum Brain Dynamics, we show that the doubling of the phase space required by the brain dissipative dynamics may model the emergence of consciousness mechanisms.This "doubling" is strange and new. I do not yet understand its full meaning. That it is a time-reverse mirror is suggestive of the Wheeler-Feynman-Cramer-Hoyle-Narlikar set of ideas in which the Born probability rule is the modulation of a retarded quantum wave by its advanced mirror "complex conjugate" forming a closed loop between preparation and detection. Note if there was an mismatch phase shift the modulated wave would not be real, but complex and would violate unitarity which is what dissipation does.
We discuss dissipation also in relation with the quantization of matter in the presence of gravitational field and with reference to the recently proposed Penrose and Hameroff-Penrose scheme for state vector reduction.Still this Copenhagen idealism with it's "reduction" that Bohm dispenses with.
We address our discussion to problems such as the `scale' problem, the `arrow of time' (breakdown of time reversal symmetry), coherence and nonlocality, the reduction of the brain quantum state (wave function collapse) and the role of occasional (random) weak perturbations arising from the brain environment coupling, the binding problem.
Intentionality and complementarity
S. Jeffers <FS300017@sol.yorku.ca>
(Department of Physics and Astronomy, York University, North York,
Ontario, M6P 3C3, Canada)
The original account of the famous double slit invoked the Heisenberg Uncertainty Relations to assert the impossibility of simultaneously observing interference fringes with 100% contrast and determining, with absolute certainty, through which slit the particle actually passed. This was asserted to be true given that the interaction of the photon of light used to illuminate the particle would disturb the path of the particle by imparting its momentum to the particle. Recent two beam interference experiments have been carried out in which, in principle, path information may be obtained without introducing any uncontrollable disturbance in the interfering beams in the sense implied by the Uncertainty Relations. However, any attempt to extract this information from the experimental apparatus does in fact result in the reduction of the contrast of the interference fringes.I suggested this "two-particle interferometry" experiment in the early versions of Gary Zukav's book in 1979, The Dancing Wu Li Masters which sold hundreds of thousands of copies. Gary was my roommate when I brought him down to Esalen and helped him write the book. He knew no physics when he started. Gary, losing his nerve and his integrity simultaneously, 1984, removed this part (among others that I wrote for him) in later editions thereby significantly weakening the power of the original. I predicted one could communicate with this device by modulating the local fringe contrast at a distance.The local fringe contrast in orthodox quantum mechanics is always exactly zero in this kind of experiment. Jeffers above, I believe, is talking about an effect seen in the nonlocal correlation pattern.
Now if we consider a photon pair A and B moving in opposite directions. The entangled pair state, in the above experiment will be of the form (mod normalization)
There will never be any local fringe contrast at the screen where photon A arrives. However, if we were able to use non-orthogonal states in which
we would have a communication device. Eberhard's theorem forbids this in orthodox quantum mechanics. If we could use squeezed states instead of single-photon states, we could communicate by modulating the fringe contrast at a distance because the over-complete set of squeezed states are not mutually orthogonal. The squeezed states are eigenfunctions of a non-Hermitian operator, and they correspond to a dissipative non-unitary generalization of quantum mechanics such as my back-action theory provides.
Thus the Principle of Complementarity has a deeper foundation than the Uncertainty Relations. It follows that, if it were possible, by any means, to extract path information from a two beam interference experiment then this would be manifest in a reduction of the contrast of the fringes. A double slit experiment has been conducted in which participants have been invited either to exert their intentionality in consciously directing the energy preferentially through one path or to abstract at any time the nature of the energy flow. Success at either task would be indicated by a drop in the fringe contrast. These experiments and the results obtained to date will be described in detail.
Interpretations of quantum theory and their theological analogs
J.
Satinover <74157.1147@compuserve.com> (38 Steephill Road, Weston,
CT 06883, USA.)
Ever since its advent, the interpretation of quantum mechanics has been a major concern of both physicists and philosophers. This has been true narrowly within physics proper, but it has become an even more important concern in the broader application of quantum theory to biological systems and especially to the problem of consciousness. The need for an interpretation arises because of the seeming incompleteness of quantum theory; that is, the fact that it not only seems to leave the door open for some inexplicable factor (or factors) that yield specific, probabalistically weighted, but finally nondeterministic outcomes for every collapse of the wave function, but that it requires such inexplicability.Only in Bohr's version, not in Bohm's.
I repeat
The Heisenberg-Bohr tranquilizing philosophy--or religion?--is so delicately contrived that, for the time being,
it provides a gentle pillow for the true believer
from which he cannot very easily be aroused.
So let him lie there.
Albert Einstein
The work of Roland Omnes is used as a convenient starting point: his demonstration that the most consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics is one which accepts that quantum mechanics at once illustrates the absolute need for such inexplicable factors in order to construct a consistent picture of physical reality; and also demands that these factors must remain inexplicable (not just as a matter of knowing, but as a feature of that same physical reality).This shows how much harm Bohr has done. The above is refuted by the book, The Undivided Universe, by Bohm and Hiley.
Building on this, Satinover argues that because of their absolute inexplicability, these invisible factors serve as the perfect projection screen. That is, the many untestable theories that attempt to explain these inexplicable factors are (precisely because of the inexplicability) peculiarly subject to being influenced by mere preference, or prejudice. Einstein's famous plaint that God doesn't play dice is a famous example of this process, reflecting not scientific hypothesis generation but Einstein's distinctive, Spinozan ideas about God, ideas about which he was far from neutral, in spite of his not formally being a theologian. In fact, the prominent interpretations about quantum mechanics, especially as these play themselves out in the attempt to understand consciousness, both depend upon circularity of some sort or another in their argumentation (non-computable knowledge, for example, can be so characterized, it will be argued) and also reproduce the major categories (worldviews) of theological speculation: materialism, animism, pantheism, panentheism and theism. Some of these speculations are highly favored (e.g., pantheism), others are not (e.g., theism), but none on the basis of evidence, since there is (and per Omnes can be) none. The favored hypotheses are, rather, those that most closey reflect the theological prejudices and general worldview of the age. (This is most evident in the softer generalizations of quantum theory which build their case by analogy alone.) In fact, if Omnes (and others) are correct in their claim that quantum mechanics delineates the boundary of scientific investigation into the physical world, there is no way that we can ever learn from the physical side out, as it were, anything about the nature of the metaphysical dimension that conditions the inexplicable factors which generate the precise moment to moment character of physical reality. The only possible way that we could learn about these factors is if those theological speculations are correct which attribute to that dimension both intentionality and communicative powers (e.g., the more theistic speculations, which would characterize such one way communication as revelation). In that case, we could conceivably learn something about that dimension from its own intention to tell us.(Italics not in the original).
Satinover's final remarks in italics is precisely what I do in my postulate that the Bohm pilot wave is "mental" and tthen it can be shown that back-action permits intention in the fundamental warp and woof of the Universe.
Is consciousness a violation of quantum mechanics?
J.
Brian Josephson has suggested that living matter is able to use nonlocal quantum connections in a way that transcends the statistical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics. Henry Stapp has published a detailed mathematical model of `intent' in accord with Josephson's qualitative idea. Roger Penrose has conjectured a new kind of gravitational self-collapse of the wavefunction of the brain beyond ordinary quantum mechanics that he connects with qualia.
All this work assumes Bohr's Copenhagen Interpretation in which there actually is a `collapse' from potentiality to actuality. I look at the mind-matter problem from the different perspective of Bohm's nonlocal hidden variable quantum theory in which the wave function has equal ontological status with matter. In contrast, Bohr throws matter, in the classical visualizable sense, away at the quantum level. Matter re-emerges in a `classical limit' connected with `collapse'. In accord with Chalmer's idea, I posit that the wavefunction is intrinsically `mental' capable of qualia. Bohm showed that the Schrodinger equation and the Born probability interpretation of orthodox quantum mechanics depend upon the approximation that there is a new kind of `organic' or `wholistic' nonlocal and context dependent `quantum force' that the wave function exerts on matter in addition to the electro-weak, strong and gravitational forces. If we think of this as a kind of `mental' force we immediately understand how mind moves matter in an animistic picture of a living universe. That's the easy problem.
The hard problem is how matter acts back on the mental wavefunction. Bohm, in 1952, proved that any direct back-action of matter on its wavefunction violates the Schrodinger equation and the equation of continuity of probability current required for the Born probability interpretation. I argue that this is precisely what is needed to explain the creative evolution of all living organizations of matter which are open systems far from thermal equilibrium that continually measure themselves. Back-action of matter on mind (as wave function) completes the feedback control loop between matter and mind in this unabashedly dualistic theory. Data flow from certain collective modes of living brain matter, as modeled by Hameroff, is what enables perception, feeling and intent which are intrinsic properties of the dynamic patterns of the macroscopically coherent quantum wave function of these high level modes. The mind is protected against thermal decoherence of the environment in accord with Mulhauser's idea.
In conclusion, ordinary quantum mechanics is as incapable of explaining qualia as is classical mechanics and electrodynamics. We require a new mechanics beyond the quantum in which matter and mind co-determine each other. The new mechanics reduces to ordinary quantum mechanics for low level modes when the back action reduces to zero.
Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules:
a model for consciousness
S. Hameroff (Departments of Anesthesiology
and Psychology, The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA.),
R. Penrose
Features of consciousness difficult to understand in terms of conventional neuroscience have evoked application of quantum theory, which describes the fundamental behavior of matter and energy. In this paper we propose that aspects of quantum theory (e.g. quantum coherence) and of a newly proposed physical phenomenon of quantum wave function `self-collapse' (objective reduction: OR -- Penrose, 1994) are essential for consciousness, and occur in cytoskeletal microtubules and other structures within each of the brain's neurons.My back-action without collapse replaces orchestrated objective reduction. The back-action term is implemented in a special way in the Nanopoulos "brain with strings" model. It has the nice feature that is of the same form as Prigogine's "self-organizing" term.
The particular characteristics of microtubules suitable for quantum effects include their crystal-like lattice structure, hollow inner core, organization of cell function and capacity for information processing. We envisage that conformational states of microtubule subunits (tubulins) are coupled to internal quantum events, and cooperatively interact (compute) with other tubulins.Nanopoulos says this is equivalent to a 2-D Ising model problem that is isomorphic to a superstring theory.
.
We further assume that macroscopic coherent superposition of quantum-coupled tubulin conformational states occurs throughout significant brain volumes and provides the global binding essential to consciousness.This is where my quantum-Carnot engine effect in the Frohlich mode may be essential. It is the only specific universal way v(i.e., a consequence, not a violation, of the second law of thermodynamics at the quantum level) of providing the thermal shielding needed to preserve coherence. Basically the ordered water in contact with the Frohlich electric dipole membrane oscillations is made into a boundary layer of "ice" on the nanometer scale. This allows the quantum gravity friction to play its role in the quantum computing process modeled by both Nanopoulos and Penrose in significantly different ways!
We equate the emergence of the microtubule quantum coherence with pre-conscious processing which grows (for up to 500 milliseconds) until the mass-energy difference among the separated states of tubulins reaches a threshold related to quantum gravity. According to the arguments for OR put forth in Penrose (1994), superpositioned states each have their own space-time geometries. When the degree of coherent mass-energy difference leads to sufficient separation of space-time geometry, the system must choose and decay (reduce, collapse) to a single universe state. In this way, a transient superposition of slightly differing space-time geometries persists until an abrupt quantum classical reduction occurs. Unlike the random, `subjective reduction' (SR, or R) of standard quantum theory caused by observation or environmental entanglement, the OR we propose in microtubules is a self-collapse and it results in particular patterns of microtubule-tubulin conformational states that regulate neuronal activities including synaptic functions. Possibilities and probabilities for post- reduction tubulin states are influenced by factors including attachments of microtubule-associated proteins (MAPs) acting as `nodes' which tune and `orchestrate' the quantum oscillations. We thus term the self-tuning OR process in microtubules `orchestrated objective reduction' (`Orch OR'), and calculate an estimate for the number of tubulins (and neurons) whose coherence for relevant time periods (e.g. 500 milliseconds) will elicit Orch OR. In providing a connection among 1) pre-conscious to conscious transition, 2) fundamental space-time notions, 3) non-computability, and 4) binding of various (time scale and spatial) reductions into an instantaneous event (`conscious now'), we believe Orch OR in brain microtubules is the most specific and plausible model for consciousness yet proposed.
B.J. Flanagan <bflanagn@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu>
(308 Church Street #1, Iowa City, IA 52245, USA.)
Some Help from Our Friends [Beatles: Here Comes the Sun; We see a golden shining orb, around which wacky professors -- academic robes like sails, caps awry, in quaint professorial German & English accents, learned intonations -- fly among clouds of abstractions, winging up to solar system which we see as expression of curvature in Riemannian space time, by degrees increasingly normal to plane of ecliptic until we see system in full symmetry. The word `revolutionary' apears as caption.] We are accustomed to regarding as real those sense perceptions which are common to different individuals, and which therefore are, in a measure, impersonal. The natural sciences, and in particular, the most fundamental of them, physics, deal with such sense perception.Nice imagery. Synchronicity, The Beatles "All You Need Is Love" started playing on radio as I got to edit this part here in sunny La Jolla Shores near the glorious beach.
Quantum physics, biology, and the mind as anticipatory systems
M.J.
Dudziak (Quantum Dynamics International, Inc., Melbourne, Florida
(USA))
Quantum physics is addressed from the perspective of Rosen's anticipatory systems and the category-theoretic approach to living systems.Category theory? Sounds interesting.
The claim is made that the complex nature of biological systems is irreducible to classical parts and mechanisms and suggests an applicable and necessary approach for understanding many processes that have generally been regarded as simpler and approachable by mechanistic models of analysis.This is what is accomplished from the bottom-up in Bohm's pilot wave theory without the need to introduce new top-down phenomenology.
This is particularly the case for quantum physical systems, including so called paradoxical phenomena such as EPR. Quantum superposition is taken to be an example of component relational processes, at a scale of nature that is far removed from biological organisms but operating according to similar principles.I gues you can call this "quantum without quantum". Here the author makes a wrong turn.
The notion of a collapsing wave function and the problems that follow from a state-oriented explanation of quantum events is criticized as a case of applying a mechanistic model to a system that cannot be described without global hierarchical interactions.Global hierarchy is already in the standard quantum theory since entangled states at a given level are tensor products of the parts at the level below. This is well described in Herman Weyl's classic book on group theory and quantum mechanics. Willis Harman and Ken Wilbur are reinventing the wheel is introducing unneeded top-down terms like "holon" introduced by the late Arthur Koestler. I met Koestler at the Uri Geller tests in London and visited his home on Montpelier Square, met his wife etc.
The relevance of the anticipatory, interactive-component model is further explored for its value as a scientific description of mental processes and as a method for describing cross-scalar analysis of mental, biological, and physical processes including the classic problem of consciousness."Anticipatory" -- that's simply the precognitive remote viewing reported by May, Spottiswoode et-al. It is a consequence of back-action of particle and gauge field on their pilot wave.
A new approach toward developing a mathematical formalism based upon quantum systems that interact as topological networks is explored. Phase webs of co-occurrent and co-excluded processes as introduced by Manthey et al, are shown to be mathematically describable through Clifford algebras and consistent with the categorical models of Rosen, Kampis and others.Bohm was interested in this. Sounds interesting. I sense it is important. I would like to know more about it. This should be a major topic for a Tucson III workshop.
T.S. Roberts <tim.roberts@fcit.monash.edu.au>
(Faculty of Computing and Information Technology, Monash University,
Churchill, Victoria 3844, Australia.)
In this paper, Quantum Realism is shown to correctly predict the results of Wheeler's Delayed Choice experiment and also the EPR experiments of Alain Aspect et al. Despite Bell's theorem, Quantum Realism preserves both objective reality and locality, though both in a modified sense.I don't believe it-- "modified"?
Quantum theory, space-time, consciousness, and Occam's razor
W.C.
Hoffman <wilhof@primenet.com> (2591 W. Cam. Llano. Tucson, AZ 85742
, USA)
The complexity of the scattering theory for n-body quantum systems (Sigal, 1983) occasions doubt as to ever finding a `wave function of the brain.'Wrong! The quantum Carnot engine shows how the pumped Frohlich electric dipole mode can be shielded from entanglement with the thermal perturbations which get frozen out on a scale of a few nanometers from the microtubules. It is beginning to look more and more like the human mind is the protected quantum pilot qualia wave of the Frohlich modes.
Quantum effects certainly enter indirectly via neurochemistry, but a brief study of the inhomogeneities of brain gross anatomy (Smith. 1981) reveals a medium inhomogeneous beyond belief with a tortuous arterial system (MacKay. 1967) and many clefts, nuclei. gyri, plexuses, and projection systems. At the microscopic level occur countless neurons, glia, cortical layers, and microcolumns. An attempt to solve Schrodinger's equation in such an inhomogeneous medium seems foredoomed to failure.I am not that pessimistic that we cannot make interesting models with supercomputers.
We do know that brain functions proceed by flows through neuronal processes. Such neuronal flows are mediated by thousands of synaptic junctions in particular neurochemical pathways and are distinguished in cortical cytoarchitecture by their associated neuronal arborescences. Such a structure of flows along `path curves' (orbits) is amenable to modern differential geometry and topology. For the visual system, the reasoning is as follows: The projection of the field of view on the retina is a surface. The Figure-Ground Relation means that the visual objects on this surface are defined by visual contours. Visual contours are the state of the visual system, texture being determined by topological transversality (Hoffman & Dodwell, 1985). Recognition of visual objects is invariant under the deformations imposed by viewing conditions, which is termed psychological constancy. The natural mathematical structure for mediating such invariances over a manifold (the `cortical retina') is continuous transformation groups (Hoffman, 1966).Nice!
The transformation group appropriate to the constancies is the conformal group CO(1,3) (Hoffman, 1994a). Its prolongations provide higher form perception (Hoffman, 1970, 1977, 1984, 1994b). CO(1,3) also governs causality and the Lorentz transformation, and so motion perception (Caelli, Hoffman, & Lindman, 1978) according to Subjective Special Relativity Theory.This is a breakthrough if it is true. I just realized that the Bogoliubov transform in Nanopoulos "brain with strings" model may have this formal structure of CO(1,3) because of the cosh and sinh terms which suggest that we can define an effective rapidity. I could be wrong, but if I am right, it would explain this!
The distinction between the egocentered `laboratory frame' and the `moving frame' of the external world induces basic self-awareness (Hoffman, 1990).I don't get this.
Pribram's posterior intrinsic systems have the structure of (topological) fibre bundles: a base space (midbrain and brain stem); total space (neocortex and limbic system); and projection (afferent) and cross-section (efferent) mappings connecting the two spaces.I like it. I really like it! :-)
The functor from the category of fibre bundles to the category of simplicial objects generates Information Processing Psychology (Hoffman, 1980a, 1980b. 1985).Far out! Sounds intriguing. I dig it, Dude. Play on!
The isomorphism between the simplicial category and the symmetric difference (Hocking & Young. 1961) then yields Riegel's Dialectical Psychology (Hoffman. 1989, 1995).Really? OK OK I am hooked. Let's see the details. This is good stuff. The Rabbi says "This is kosher". This guy really seems to know what he is talking about. :-)

Consciousness consists of subjective decision-making for the objects of cognition (`experience.' concepts, procedures. plans, etc.) by means of dialectical thinking. Occam's Razor is a principle in the philosophy of science that says that one should not multiply hypotheses unnecessarily.That's one reason I like the Bohm pilot wave as qualia postulate with back-action -- it's the biggest bang for the buck giving more with less.
Dialectical Psychology and the Subjective Special Theory of Relativity provide a more natural. more realistic, and more economical duality for consciousness than that of a `quantum theory of mind.'Uh Oh! Another wrong turn! Them's fighting words. Gunfight at the OK Corral. We will call it Tombstone I instead of Tucson III. :-)
Quantum computation would be fraught with difficulties (Peterson. 1995), and the practical restrictions for Bose-Einstein condensates (Wu, 1995) of a six-laser interference system acting on a gas at 20 microkelvins in a strong magnetic trap are wholly at variance with the medium in the brain.Nonsense. The author, though formally brilliant, simply does not know enough physics and does not understand the significant difference between the open pumped Frohlich mode and the equilbrium experiment he cites above.
Schroedinger, Shankara and the science of consciousness
R.
Nair (NISTADS, K.S. Krishnan Marg, New Delhi 110012, India)
Erwin Schroedinger, following the advaita philosopher Shankara, advocated a view of consciousness as absolute and unitary. This view was combined, in his case as in Shankara's, with a view of scientific knowledge as objective, presupposing a sharp separation between subject and object. On this basis, Schroedinger opposed the anti-realism of the Copenhagen school and the claim that it is impossible to effect such a sharp separation in quantum theory. According to Schroedinger, the `principle of objectivation' which is a sine qua non for science, fails when such objectivation is unattainable. Thus a corollary is that a `science of consciousness' is an oxymoron. Schroedinger argues that the subject of conscious experience is not found in the world picture `because it is itself that picture'. The world picture is constructed by the subject in accord with the principle of objectivation and is itself (an aspect of) consciousness. The unification of science realizes the unitary nature of the subject; consequently the programme of unifying conscious phenomena with other sorts of phenomena is natural to this perspective, as indeed was the unification of physics and biology advocated by Schroedinger. However, this does not yield a science of consciousness, only a more unified science that shows clearly a homology with the unity of the subject. This paper investigates this unusual perspective, which while strongly supportive of the unification programme, cautions against characterising its results as a science of consciousness.Bohr's version of quantum theory leads to this sort of thing. Bohm's theory makes it all irrelevant. See the damage Bohr has done to clear thinking!
The brain zeno effect loop-structure, time and consciousness
E.
Ruhnau <eva@tango.imp.med.uni-muenchen.de> (Institut fr Medizinische
Psychologie, Ludwig-Maximilians Universitt, Goethestr. 31, D-80336
Munchen, FRG)
Any entity or event that we normally perceive engages spatially separate module's of the brain.Yes, a basic fact of neuroscience leading us to suspect that quantum nonlocality plays a vital role in consciousness. Crick's 40 hz clock also plays a role but no electrical structure by itself can explain qualia as Chalmers correctly shows.
This fragmentation of sensory Information processing is in contrast with the experience of perceptual coherence of entities and events. How the brain achieves such an integration is a crucial question, the so-called `binding-problem'.Yes.
There is some evidence that perceptual binding may be based on mental representation via cell assemblies, i.e. strongly interconnected neurons that exhibit synchronous activity. Spatio-temporal coherence of the external world is represented as isomorphic net structure. This paper does not consider the question how the system (the brain) works to achieve binding, but what the system does, i.e. the effectiveness of synchronous oscillations. There is experimental evidence that such an effectiveness can be registered on the output side, i.e. in considering the temporal structure of the motor behavior. Perceptual unity may be conditional for the unity of action, and vice versa, both being necessary preconditions for the occurrence of consciousness. As a formal solution of the binding problem, two temporal mechanisms constraining conscious experience are discussed: 1) adirectional temporal zones of approximately 30 msec (external) duration connected to the coherent binding of entities; 2). a mechanism in grating adirectional temporal zones up to a sec, thus providing the basis of coherent binding of entities Into contexts. Based on these results from the neurosciences, a mathematical theory of Gestalt and event formation Is proposed. Next, these concepts are compared with structural similar problems in quantum theory, i.e. the collapse of the wave function or the emergence of irreversibility and objects. The point of view taken here is not that concrete quantum theoretical effects generate or contribute to conscious experience. Abstract quantum theory as holistic theory and theory of transition from possibilities to fact is considered. It turns out that the usual physical concept of (continuous) time as real valued parameter is insufficient, it is too static. A formalized notion of the `presence' or the `Now' is necessary (also in physics) express the dynamical nature of time itself. The structural analogies and differences of Gestalt, event and object formation in brain theory and physics are taken as `data' to construct a general theory of time and observation. The mathematical tool to achieve such a formalization is category theory. The quantum Zeno effect and temporal EPR-correlations are discussed. The proposed theory provides a frame to define different levels of consciousness tied to discrete and continuous structures of time.
The case for the non-quantum receptor
E.R. Close (P.O.
Box 376 Jackson, MO 63755, USA)
This paper presents the case for the existence of a non-quantum substance associated with the functioning of consciousness in physical structures.A bad start.
Accepting the premise that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics was proved correct by Bell's theorem and the results of the Aspect experiment,False premise. Aspect's theory does not choose one interpretation over another for orthodox quantum mechanics. The author is out of his depth. This is an amateurish effort.
an adaptation of G. Spencer Brown's calculus of indications is used to show that an infinite-descent contradiction of the basic principle of quantum mechanics can only be avoided if a non-quantum final receptor exists to complete the process of physical observation.Well I never could make hide nor hair out of G. Spencer Brown's jargon which IMHO is New Age Vaguery -- even though Margaret Meade's husband made it popular at Esalen when I was there. That pompous pundit, Stewart Brand, also gave it more publicity than it deserved. Bohm's theory does away with the ambiguity in the "Von-Neumann cut" which is what the author is really trying to get at in a vague way.
The paper also discusses how the existence of a non-quantum receptor resolves numerous problems associated with the functioning of brain cell structures and neural synapses to support the various mental and psychological functions of consciousness.The ultimate receptor is the quantum qualia pilot wave. That's All Folks!
There are no such things as Schrodinger's cats!
Oh yeah? Sez who? :-)
J.S.
It was Wigner who first speculated that the von Neumann collapse of the wave function occurred by an act of consciousness in the human brain. This consciousness-induced collapse seems to explain well the Schrodinger's cat paradox: after opening the box which contains the cat we see it dead or alive because conscious observation collapsed the wave function of the corresponding opposite quantum state. Here I defend the idea that Schrodinger's cat paradox cannot serve as a bridge to connect quantum mechanics with consciousness. The idea goes along the following line of thought:This paper is not even wrong.1. By means of the operation of distinction the observer specifies a unity as an entity distinct from a background and a background as the domain in which an entity is distinguished. This process can be conscious or unconscious and is hardware-dependent.
2. People are accustomed to distinguish `alive' and `dead' cats. This distinction is semantically and extensionally erroneous.
3. `Alive' and `dead' operators cannot be built in quantum mechanics: ` aliveness' and ` deadness', as eigenvalues have no physical meaning, specially because the latter does not correspond to any system.
4. Wave functions for `dead' cats cannot be written because there are no dead cats (i.e., they cannot be distinguished, only semantically defined as existing). All the above suggests that Schrodinger's cat paradox is a semantic problem. Therefore, consciousness is not necessary to solve this apparent paradox.
What role could quantum mechanical reduction play in consciousness?
G.J.F.
Blommestijn <gblom@nki.nl> (Mgr H Poelslaan 118, NL 1187 BE Amstelveen,
The Netherlands)
The general reaction of neuroscientists to the idea that quantum theory is important for the understanding of consciousness, is adequately illustrated by the following statement: `Despite the rather breathtaking flimsiness of the consciousness-quantum connection the idea has enjoyed a surprisingly warm reception, at least outside neuroscience. One cannot help groping about for some explanation for this rather odd fact.' [Grush and Churchland, 1995, JCS, 2(1), p. 27]. The arguments in favor don't convince the neuroscientists, and they still miss experimental data as well as a consistent theory. The aim of this presentation is to offer such a consistent theory, which gives quantum mechanics, and particularly the wave function reduction process, its (hopefully) proper place in relation to consciousness.This seems to be the same as Stapp's theory assuming that the Born probability rule permits "free choice". It lacks back-action and does not explain how intent shapes the "often very peaked probability spectra of the values of the observable".The central hypothesis of this theory is a type identity between quantum mechanical wave function reduction processes on the one hand and the highest level input and output processes of consciousness on the other hand. Such an input or output process should be thought of as being the ultimate last input or first output step in (sub)neuronal processing that converts something into a conscious experience, or from a conscious choice or will into a chain of motor signals and action. This central hypothesis leads to the prediction of a quantum mechanically coherent, non-local, (sub)neuronal, molecular structure in the brain that probably ranges over a lot of neurons. In this structure the neuronal processes generate an extended, non-local, coherent wave function. The quantum mechanical reduction of this wave function at a certain moment constitutes the total of conscious experience at that moment due to the perception part of the structure and also the total of conscious choice and decision due to its action part. Thereby the tendencies to make a certain choice and to have a certain possible perception are formed by the often very peaked probability spectra of the values of the observables, to which the wave function may reduce. Which one of the possible outcomes will be the result of the reduction is not determined by any law; it is essentially free. Quantum mechanical reductions not only occur in the human brain. The central hypothesis therefore also implies that not only humans but all other organisms on the evolutionary tree, and even inorganic matter, possess some form of consciousness. The repertory of conscious experiences and choices of a certain organism depend on the possibilities of the wave function reductions in the above structure, i.e. its `reduction boundary'. The main implications of the theory will be elucidated, as well as its position with respect to other theories.
Why are quantum physicists at a conference on consciousness?
E.J.
Squires (University of Durham, Durham City, DH1 3LE, England)
The most significant difference between classical physics and quantum physics is that the latter implicity involves consciousness. In particular, it refers to what is observed rather than what is. Not surprisingly, this fact has been exploited in attempts to use quantum physics to obtain some insights into the nature of consciousness. In this talk the view that quantum theory is indeed essential to an understanding of the relation between consciousness and the physical world will be supported, but caution will be urged towards exaggerated claims that quantum theory explains consciousness. Reasons why quantum theory, as presently formulated, is incomplete will be explained, and a variety of published suggestions for its completion, all of which are in some way associated with consciousness, will be compared and critically examined. Arguments will be given why the form of `many worlds' theories, in which all experiences actually occur, are unsatisfactory, and experiments which might test such ideas will be suggested. Models in which consciousness is, or is related to, the `selection' agency that completes quantum theory by giving unique `results' will be discussed, and it will be claimed that they are more convincing, even though they could have unexpected implications.I have given a detailed commentary already on this. I agree with it.