Nature divides in to rocklike things and idealike things. Thoughts are fleeting. The enduring rock is public. The fleeting thought is private. Stapp proposes the Heisenberg/James model which asserts that brain processes are causally influenced by subjective conscious experience. I explain that as the Bohm pilot-wave force on its brain beable. Quantum effects are not only on the tiny scale in space.

William James defines "spiritualistic" p.9 which "affiliate the divers mental modes … upon a simple entity, the personal soul". This exactly fits my pilot wave model. James rejected this for the associationistic seeking of "common elements in the divers mental facts rather than a common element behind them." But his reasons for rejecting the spirit do not hold up in view of Bohm’s theory. The associationistic view does seem to fit the epistemological Bohr way of doing quantum mechanics. The Bohm pilot-wave is the common ontological ground of being supporting the "mental facts" i.e., qualia.

William James, many years ago, wrote "We can form no positive image of the modus operandi of a volition or other thought affecting the cerebral molecules.". Stapp (p. 10) adds "This seeming impossibility of even imagining how an idea, or a thought, could influence the motions of molecules in the brain is certainly a main support for the highly counterintuitive notion that mind cannot influence matter. If there were a simple model showing how such an influence could occur in a completely natural way, and within the framework of the established laws of physics, then the notion that our thoughts cannot effect our actions would undoubtedly lose much of its appeal." Of course my theory that the mind is the Bohm pilot wave (when back-action is effective) does exactly that. The nonlocal contextual quantum force of mind on the cerebral molecules, or beables, is precisely the negative spatial gradient of the quantum potential Q. The back-action is the reverse dissipative force of these "cerebral molecules", i.e., microtubules in more modern terms, on the mind. Therefore, the mind and its brain co-evolve or self-organize subject to external environmental Darwinian natural selection local gauge forces.

Stapp says (p.13) that William James "recognized that the problem of the connection of conscious process to brain process was irresolvable within the framework of the classical physics of his day."

"James’s principle claim, at the fundamental level, is the wholeness, or unity of each conscious thought. Each thought has components, but the whole is, he claims, more than just a simple collection of its components… It is these whole thoughts that are the proper fundamental elements of psychological theory, not some collection of ‘elementary components’ out of which our thoughts are assumed to be formed by simple aggregation." p.11

My notion that the nonlocal contextual Bohm quantum potential Q with back-action forms the mindscape for the motion of the brain-beable in configuration space, pictures the components of thought as basins of attraction in this seamless mindscape. The experience of a quale (i.e., a subjective mental experience) happens when the brain-beable is transiently trapped in a basin of attraction on the Q-mindscape. These attractors correspond to eigenfunctions of the measured observables. This quantum model of mind is in complete accord with James’s idea here. Stapp cites James as saying "the whole brain must act together if certain conscious thoughts are to occur". This corresponds to the tight-coupling or co-evolution between Q-mind and beable-brain in my new theory. The Q-mindscape extends over the entire brain, if not beyond, and it is protected against thermal noise (i.e. interactive decoherence). In summary, the nonlocality and contextual-dependence of the Q-mindscape easily explain James’s notion of the unity of each conscious thought.

Another key property of consciousness is its power of selection. Stapp cites James, "consciousness is at all times primarily a selecting agency". This is also immediately understood in my theory as the co-evolution between Q-mind and brain-beable. The decision to act or select is made when the brain-beable is captured by an attractor on the Q-mindscape. The nonlocal contextual force -gradQ of mind on brain is, during the time of capture, mostly controlled by that "active informational" attractor if it is sufficiently separated from the other attractors. One must remember here that the co-evolution, made possible by back-action, means that the shape of the Q-mindscape everywhere, even distant in configuration space, from the actual occupied attractor, is continually distorting, even bifurcating, with changes in the path of the brain-beable. These beable path changes are partly due to the intrinsic self-organizing -gradQ force, as well as external, but coherent, Darwinian natural selection forces from the electromagnetic fields of the nerve impulses and the molecular messengers. Clearly, the occupied "active information" attractor is the conscious part of the mind, while the unoccupied attractors elsewhere on the coherent seamless but dynamic Q-mindscape is the sub-conscious part of the mind. Any attractor will emerge into consciousness if the beable falls into its basin of attraction. Of course, the shape of the attractor is shifting with the motion of the beable. This nonlocal influence explains the association of ideas, the creation of new ones and the forgetting of old ones. Permanent memories have very deep attractors.

Special Relativity

Newton’s "universal "now" (i.e., absolute simultaneity): a present instant of time defined unambiguously for every point in space" overturned by Einstein in 1905 because it could not be tested. Should "every concept in physics … be empirically testable"? Einstein, later turned his back on this positivist metaphysical rule that served him well in special relativity because it obstructed progress in general relativity and in quantum mechanics. The most important goal of science, as a human enterprise, is to enlarge our understanding of nature. Rejecting absolute simultaneity led to the rejection of Newtonian instantaneous action-at-a-distance – "for ‘instantaneous’ lost all meaning" p.12. Of course, I add (not in Stapp’s text) that the logic here is not sound, because Einstein replaced relative simultaneity with absolute spacelike-separation which IS frame-invariant. So we can imagine an invariant spacelike action-at-a-distance (or "influence") which is faster-than-light in all frames of reference. Of course, the time sequence between cause and effect is not frame-invariant for spacelike influences. "This led to the second pertinent consequence of the special theory of relativity, the idea of that no influence" can act faster-than-light. "This idea of no faster-than-light influence, like positivism, was also later to come into question…" p.12

Stapp quickly disposes of John B. Watson’s silly idea of behavioristic rat psychology that dominated American academia with an anemic view of human nature in which consciousness is not at all recognized making us all zombies.

Stapp describes the pragmatic (i.e., Bohr) Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. It says that we must be content with positivistic rules that give probabilistic connections between reproducible statistical events. There is no hope of describing an individual. This is like the collectivism of the totalitarian-state in which individual differences are suppressed. Bohr lived and created his version of quantum mechanics in the time of the rise of Stalinism and Hitlerism. "It avers that we scientists should be content with rules that allow us to compute all empirically verifiable relationships between our observations. This view claims that no ‘deeper understanding’ is really a proper part of science." Of course, Einstein did not accept this. Bohm did not accept it. I do not accept it. Penrose does accept it though he adds the new element of "orchestration" Godel-jumping beyond orthodox quantum mechanics to solve the consciousness problem which Brian Josephson, Nanopoulos, myself and others also do. Stapp cites Einstein’s prescient remark: "… the contemporary quantum theory … constitutes an optimum formulation …. But … offers no useful point of departures for future developments.". Penrose’s "orch OR" idea is such a future development based upon the Copenhagen interpretation, but it suffers from the same vagueness of visualization. This is in contrast to Bohm’s interpretation in which back-action is the clearly visualizable "future development".

1.6 is about Einstein’s recanting of his early positivism in the famous conversation with Heisenberg. Einstein insisted on the existence of the particular hidden-variable or beable (Bell’s term), namely, the atomic orbits of the electron. P.15 Einstein said: "Perhaps I did use such a philosophy earlier, and even wrote it, but it is nonsense all the same." Stapp describes Einstein’s theory of gravitation : "[Einstein] created in 1915, the general theory of relativity. That theory welded the absolute space and absolute time of Newton into an absolute spacetime. There are no observers or measurements. Rather there is an entire plenum of unobservable spacetime points bound together by differential equations. … Einstein was driven, not by any effort to codify data, but rather by the demands for rational coherence, and an abstract ‘principle of equivalence’.."

I have the same drive in my Bohmian theory of the mind-matter interaction. I can’t get Ed May to see the value of it because he still thinks that the ultimate aim of physics is to codify data as in his DAT model which I do not object to, though apparently York Dobyns does.

"Let us then consider what we regard as the main advantages of our interpretation… it provides an intuitive grasp of the whole process. This makes the theory much more intelligible than one that is restricted to mathematical equations and statistical rules for using these equations to determine the probable outcomes of experiments. Even though many physicists feel that making such calculations is basically what physics is all about, it is our view that the intuitive and imaginative side which makes the whole theory intelligible is as important in the long run as is the side of mathematical calculation." D. Bohm & B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe (Routledge, 1993) p.4

Stapp says Einstein told Born that, regarding general relativity, he would give no argument in its favor, because once the theory was understood no such argument would be needed. Of course the test is experiment. I feel the same way about my theory of the mind-matter interaction in which the quantum pilot wave sets up a mindscape in the configuration space of the brain-beable. The shape of this mindscape and the path of the brain-beable both depend directly on each other and co-evolve i.e., self-organize, in the wake of external environmental Darwinian selection forces. Qualia correspond to the attractors in the mindscape. The complete set of attractors over the entire mindscape form the contents of the subconscious mind. The one momentarily occupied attractor is the experienced be-here-now moment of consciousness. The attractors are continually changing and bifurcating unless they are very deep forming permanent memories. The experimental test of my theory will be the manufacture of conscious quantum computing silicon chips at room temperature as well as conscious doped superfluid systems near absolute zero. The spinning dopants play the same role that microtubule input-output switches do in the living cell.

Stapp (p.16) continues: "The general theory … undermined the two general conclusions of the special theory… namely the claim of the virtue in science of strict adherence to positivism, and of the absence in nature of a preferred instant ‘now’ … many solutions of the equations of general relativity do have a preferred sequence of instantaneous ‘nows’. Furthermore, the universe we are living in has a global preferred rest frame, which defines instantaneous ‘nows’ empirically. This frame has very recently been empirically specified to within several parts per million." p.16

The preferred global rest frame is that of the "Hubble flow" of the expanding universe in which the cosmic black body radiation remnant from the big bang is isotropic to several parts per million. The absolute cosmic time from the big bang is determined by the absolute temperature of this remnant. This is the key observational fact for interstellar and intergalactic navigation.

Bohm’s pilot wave theory requires such a preferred global rest frame for individual quantum processes because of the nonlocality of the quantum force that the pilot-wave exerts on its hidden-variable (beable). However, the local statistical averages over an ensemble of individuals obey the Lorentz symmetry of special relativity.

The lesson to be learned here, is that the strategy of rational coherence supersedes the tactic of the naïve pragmatism, known as "positivism", which is at the core of Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Central to Bohr’s dogma is the still common belief of the majority of well-paid tenured physics professors that it is impossible, literally impossible, to visualize and understand "what was going on behind the visible phenomena". I remember back in the 1950’s at Cornell where none of the great physicists discussed Bohm’s hidden-variable theory as a serious contender. The same was true at Brandeis, and at the University of California in the sixties. The result, traditional theoretical physics is almost dead at the end of the twentieth century. Remember, I said "traditional" in the sense of "orthodox". There is a new post-modern theoretical physics of the mind-matter interaction based on Bohm’s pilot wave/beable paradigm that is alive and well. This is not to be confounded with Bohm’s later "implicate order" visionary metaphysics which has not yet reached the state of definiteness that would make it a part of the precise post-modern theoretical physics that will dominate the twenty-first century.

1.7 Bohm’s pilot-wave theory.

Stapp writes: "The key features of Bohm’s model are that the probability distribution exists objectively, and decomposes dynamically at the level of the macroscopic variables, during certain "measurement-type" physical processes, into distinguishable branches, one of which is singled out by a nonlocal mechanism. It is postulated that only this one singled-out branch is experienced in human consciousness." (p.18) Stapp is not as clear here as he might be about this ‘postulate’. He thinks in terms of the Bohr paradigm in which there are no hidden variables or "beables". Perhaps that is why he fails to mention the key point here that "this one singled-out branch" that "is experienced in human consciousness" is the one occupied by the beable. That is, the classical pointer position of the macroscopic measuring device is EPR correlated to that branch in which the beable is. This is all for measurements on the outer world. A very similar analysis applies to the self-measurements of conscious introspection in which the total mind, both subconscious and conscious, consists of all the branches whose beable is a special material brain substrate. The conscious part of the mind is that branch where the beable is. Even when we are sleeping the occupied branch appears as the content of a dream. If the beable is not in any one branch, but is under the influence of several branches that are not well separated we experience a dreamlike superposition of seemingly "parallel worlds". In dreamless sleep the beable is wandering in a no-man’s land between widely separated branches, i.e., "attractors", in its classical configuration space.

1. As in general relativity, there is a global preferred rest frame in which the quantum-potential acts instantaneously.

2. The quantum probability distribution is not simply something in the mind of the observer, it is not only epistemological, but it is real, i.e., ontological. In contrast, the probability distributions in classical statistical mechanics are strictly epistemological "a construct in the minds of scientists". This means that classical statistical ideas of Shannon information and entropy are mental having to do with our knowledge. This is not so for quantum information and quantum entropy in Bohm’s theory. In Bohm’s theory the notions of information and entropy have a dual nature being primarily ontological with a secondary derived epistemological property. In contrast, Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation is totally epistemological "in the minds of scientists".

3. There are hidden-variables, also called "beables" by the late John Bell, and they are precisely the point particles and gauge fields of classical physics. These gauge fields include the electromagnetic, weak and strong fields.

4. The probability distribution is determined by the pilot-wave which exerts a nonlocal (i.e., instantaneous) and context-dependent force on its attached beable. Context-dependence means that the force depends on the shape of the pilot-wave in addition to the relative positions of the particles. This follows from the Schrodinger equation for the complex-valued pilot-wave separated into two real equations. One equation is a Hamilton-Jacobi equation with the nonlocal contextual "quantum potential Q" in it. The new quantum force of the pilot wave on its attached beable is the negative spatial gradient of Q. The other equation from the Schrodinger equation is for the local conservation of probability current in configuration space. All of this assumes Born’s rule that the probability distribution is the squared modulus of the pilot-wave. The key idea here is that, in orthodox quantum mechanics, the pilot-wave does not depend on the path of its attached beable in configuration space. My back-action violates this constraint. Therefore, the back-action theory is non-orthodox. It is the new post-modern quantum mechanics required to describe living complex adaptive systems from the bottom-up as opposed to functional top-down phenomenologies. The beable’s momentum is proportional to the gradient of the phase of the pilot-wave. Therefore, the pilot-wave and the initial positions of the particles determine the motion of the beable not only in classical configuration space, but also in classical phase space. All the wave properties of matter can be understood in terms of the nonlocality and context-dependence of Q. This analysis can be generalized to the Klein-Gordon and Dirac equations for relativistic spin 0 and ½ single particles, respectively. It can also be generalized to the classical electromagnetic field. It should be possible to treat the Klein-Gordon and Dirac equations as field equations as well to get the creation and destruction of particles at high energy. The key new feature of relativistic Bohm theory is that the beable, in contrast to the pilot-wave, can move faster-than-light in finite regions of space. That is, the relativistic quantum potential Q renormalizes the bare real mass of the beable into an imaginary number. This may have a practical consequence for ultra fuel-efficient spacecraft propulsion.

Stapp writes: "Bohm was able to devise an instantaneous extra force that depends on the (objectively existing) probability distribution, and that ‘maintains’ this probability distribution, …."

Indeed, this is precisely the force of mind on matter for the case of the protected quantum pilot-wave function of the entire living body beable (both plants and animals) in my theory. Plants do not have the input/output devices to learn and express themselves. We could genetically engineer plants to be mobile and conscious like we are. This answers William James’s remark of a hundred years ago "We can form no positive image of the modus operandi of a volition or other thought affecting the cerebral molecules." The back-action of beable on its attached pilot-wave is how the body literally changes its mind in the face of new sensory information i.e., Darwininan natural genetic and cultural memetic selection pressures.

Stapp continues: "… for any given probability distribution, imagine an ensemble of classical worlds originally distributed in position and velocity so as to conform to this given probability distribution." p.17

Note, Stapp is here using probability in its classical epistemological meaning as our uncertain knowledge. The momentum of the hidden variable beable is the gradient of the phase of the wavefunction. This means that the beable has a definite position and momentum (in phase space) at each instant just as in classical physics. However, using the von-Neumann strong measurement interaction (in contrast to Aharonov’s "weak" and "protected" measurements) one gets the traditional Heisenberg uncertainty relations for the root-mean square fluctuations in the statistical ensemble of a large number of identically prepared independent quantum systems. A quantum system consists of both the pilot wave and its attached beable. There are no beables in the Copenhagen interpretations, only wave functions exist there. They are not called pilot-waves because there is no beable to be guided. "And then a miracle occurs" called "collapse", or "reduction" or "R" or "orch R" to get the classical world of beables back. Bohm does not need this miracle.

Returning to Stapp: "then this imaginary ensemble will continue forever to conform to this evolving distribution, provided each of the various worlds in this ensemble evolves under the influence of Bohm’s force." The last phrase returns us to the objective or ontological meaning of the pilot-wave. The epistemological statistical meaning of the wavefunction, fundamental in the Copenhagen interpretation, is, in Bohm’s paradigm, secondary and not fundamental. More importantly, Bohm’s theory is a theory of individual quantum systems, both simple and complex. Bohm’s theory solves at the outset what Murray Gell-Mann, in The Quark and The Jaguar, failed to solve using a local many-worlds paradigm, namely a quantum theory of individuals. When I put in back-action from beable to pilot wave, in addition to Bohm’s contextual force of nonlocal pilot-wave on beable, the resulting highly self-referential and nonlinear non-algorithmic feedback-control loop means that pilot-wave and its beable co-evolve as an individual complex adaptive quantum system. Pumped by external environmental forces, the system learns, remembers and makes freely-willed decisions. The pilot-wave is clearly the mind, i.e., "the modus operandi of a volition or other thought affecting the cerebral molecules." The "cerebral molecules" form the beable.

Bohm’s explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) Effect (p.17) according to Stapp: Refer to the Appendix on EPR below. We can measure either "color" or "size". Both are two-valued. That is "white" and "black" for "color", "large" and "small" for "size". In orthodox quantum mathematical language, "color" and "size" are "Hermitian operators" or measurement "observables" with "eigenvalues ("black", "white") and ("large", "small") respectively. Each eigenvalue also has an "eigenfunction" attached to it. The eigenfunction are particular types of pilot-waves. Operationally, in what Bohm calls "informal language", each "eigenvalue" corresponds to a well defined "pointer reading" of some classically detectable "measurement apparatus". Stapp writes: "Then after the measurement interaction has occurred the pertinent macroscopic pointer will be in one location or the other, either swung to the right or swung to the left. It will not be anywhere in between. The probability distribution will, therefore, be separable into two distinct branches, one corresponding to each of the two alternative outcomes of the measurement. … These two regions must be well separated, on the scale of visually detectable differences. …. But which of the two alternative possible outcomes ‘actually occurs’?"

You see now that in Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation, the big mystery is how anything "actually occurs". "And then a miracle" happens called "collapse" etc in which the coherently superposed shimmering dreamlike possibilities, that are the solutions of the Schroedinger equation, magically transform into a single actuality that we perceive as the classical world. It’s pure Hollywood fantasy, and almost all the physicists, and All The King’s Men, have been enchanted with it for most of the Twentieth Century. It’s not Fritjof Capra’s, or Fred Alan Wolf’s, or Gary Zukav’s, or Nick Herbert’s, or my fault, it’s Werner Heisenberg's, Eugene Wigner's and John Archibald Wheeler’s fault for being such persuasive advocates of Bohr’s ideas! J I was totally caught up in his magnificent Pied Piper’s song for years. Einstein and Bohm were among a few strong voices crying in the wilderness as the conscience of not the consciousness of the community of sleepwalking physicists. I mean the top physicists, even including the great Feynman. None were immune from the Copenhagen disease. Bohm weakened his own case in his final years by spending too much time on the vague idea of "implicate order" whose time has not yet come.

So, "which of the two alternative possible outcomes ‘actually occurs’?" Stapp continues: "That is determined, in Bohm’s model, by where the classically described pointer ends up, after the measurement operation has been completed…. This final position of the pointer will depend, of course, upon the forces that have been acting on the pointer. However, the forces needed to make the observable outcomes of the various alternative possible measurements conform to the assertions of quantum theory must be ‘nonlocal’, in the following sense: the forces acting on objects in one region must, in some cases, depend upon which experiments [e.g., "color" or "size"] is performed in the other region. But if one allows forces of this nonlocal kind then there is no problem in resolving the EPR paradox. For the paradox arises from a tacit assumption … that what happens in one time and place must be independent of what an experimenter, acting at the same time in a faraway region, decides to measure." (p.18)

If this is beginning to sound like "magick" to you, you are not far off. So, either accept Bohr’s "miracle" or Bohm’s "magick". However, the situation has some important significant differences. We must carefully distinguish faster-than-light (FTL) "influence" from "FTL-control". If we get "FTL-control" then we have real "magick-without-magic". If we are stuck with only "influence", then we have "magic without magick" which Abner Shimony calls "passion at a distance". It is a rather limp faint-hearted "passion" IMHO. J Orthodox quantum theory, with zero back-action, i.e., with no direct influence of the beable’s path on its pilot-wave, only has FTL-influence. There is no "magick" in orthodox quantum theory. There is also no "consciousness" in orthodox quantum theory. In contrast, the post-modern quantum mechanics, that I have invented to demystify the mind-brain problem, does have back-action. Therefore, it has the "magick" of FTL-control. There is no consciousness without "FTL-control". Let us continue with Stapp’s analysis: "…Bohm’s force involves instantaneous action at a distance, and leads to an explicit violation of this plausible-sounding no-faster-than-light-influence assumption, which is part of our ordinary classical idea about how nature operates."

Remember, that in my physical theory of the mind-matter interaction, Bohm’s force, in the case of living systems, is the force of mind on its attached matter or beable. The instantaneous action at a distance immediately qualitatively explains the "binding problem". We know that the brain processes sensory information in bits and pieces in widely separated parts of the brain, yet we have a unitary conscious experience. That’s the binding problem. I have explained this as the capture of the brain-beable system point in classical configuration space by an attractor on the "mindscape" set up by the pilot-wave. The "mindscape" is the quantum version of Stuart Kauffman’s classical "fitness landscape" defined in his book, The Origins of Order (Oxford, 1993). By the way, this particular idea is not me "co-opting" the Hameroff-Penrose theory, since I have said that quantum nonlocality explains the binding problem since at least 1980.

Back to Stapp: "In spite of this occurrence of faster-than-light influences, Bohm’s model can reproduces all of the predictions of a relativistic quantum field theory." (p.18) This means in the statistical average over a large ensemble of identically prepared simple systems. It is totally irrelevant for a single complex adaptive system with a giant protected quantum pilot-wave attached to it.

Stapp continues: "Moreover, it permits no faster-than-light control of events in one region by human decisions made in another. Thus the nonlocal character of Bohm’s model of reality is veiled: the nonlocal character of the force, although explicit in the model, is inaccessible to us at the practical level." (p.18)

We are now at the heart of the matter. Yes, nonlocality is "veiled" only because the back-action is effectively zero under the conditions for which orthodox quantum mechanics is a good approximation. It is a good approximation in every case where life is absent. What does it mean for the back-action to be zero? It means that the pilot-wave exerts a nonlocal contextual force on its beable, but there is no direct dependence of the pilot-wave on the path of its beable through classical configuration space. This is precisely the condition we need for the "quantum randomness" described clearly, for example, in the late Heinz Pagel’s book, The Cosmic Code. It is this quantum randomness that destroys FTL-control. In contrast, when the back action is effective, the feedback-control loop, or co-evolution of the thought-like pilot-wave and its brain-beable suppresses the quantum randomness and we now have FTL-control. FTL-control is a violation of the Born rule that the quantum probability density in classical configuration space is the squared modulus of the pilot-wave. The precise measure of sentience and intent is in the distortion away from the statistical predictions of masculine orthodox quantum mechanics. Back-action sets the veil aside and, like my alleged Qabalistic Ancestor, Solomon ha-Zarfati, a thousand years ago, we behold The Goddess of Life in all Her Naked Beauty! :-)

Stapp then describes the "many-worlds" or "parallel-universes" model of quantum reality in which there is a "conscious experience corresponding to each of the alternative possible outcomes of each ot the measurements." This model requires "that the universe splits, at the macroscopic level, into various noncommunicating branches. "(p.18) There are lots of things wrong with this approach. John Archibald Wheeler one called it "excess metaphysical baggage’. However, Hawking believes it and uses it in his quantum cosmology in which the proto-universe is a four-dimensional sphere in "imaginary time". If the universe splits, does that mean that the spacetime geometry and its mass-energy duplicates itself also? Not necessarily. We can picture quantum mechanics in terms of the mathematician’s "fiber bundle" in which there is a unique spacetime with its mass-energy called the "base space". The different branches of the quantum wavefunction, including clones of minds in each branch, are extra-dimensional hypersurfaces above and beyond spacetime in the "fiber space". The problem is that David Albert showed that the assumption that the different branches do not communicate cannot be maintained in special cases of "self-measurement" in which it is possible to take "photographs of other worlds". Murray Gell-Mann tries to use a variation on many-worlds to explain complex adaptive systems. He fails for several reasons. One is that E. J. Squires has shown a fundamental mathematical inconsistency in the Gell-Mann theory. Gell-Mann is particle motivated to use many-worlds because it is apparently local. However, Squires claims that is not even true. Stapp once argued that the three major assumptions in Bell’s theorem were:

1. the statistical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics are true

2. locality (i.e., no faster-than-light influences)

3. counter-factual definiteness (CFD)

Bell’s theorem is that all three of these assumptions are logically inconsistent. The many worlds model violates CFD. However, Squires claims that it also violates locality.

Stapp alludes to the fact that this many-worlds model is professed by a significant number of "mainline physicists". This shows how far the physics establishment will go to keep the sacred cow of locality.

Stapp then comes to the reality model which is the basis of his book. "It dispenses with Bohm’s classical world." Thus, IMHO, Stapp starts out making the great error of throwing the baby-beable out with the bathwater! J "However, it retains the idea that the probability distribution that occurs in quantum theory exists in nature herself." (p.19) In other words, the quantum wave function is "real" or "ontological" (of course it is still a complex-valued function of classical configuration space). Stapp assumes Born’s rule that the ontological probability distribution is the squared modulus of the quantum wave function. Therefore, as shown above, there is only FTL-influence with no possibility of FTL-control. The Eberhard-Stapp theorem, forbidding FTL-communication via nonlocality, is true here. It is not true in my back-action theory of the mind-matter interaction. "Indeed, in Heisenberg’s model this probability distribution, and its abrupt changes, becomes the complete representation of physical reality." (p.19) Note that in Bohm’s theory of orthodox quantum mechanics, which is what Stapp is doing here, there is zero back-action. This means, in Bohm’s model, that the "fitness landscape" (my term borrowed from Stuart Kauffman), formed by the quantum wavefunction for the beable’s system point moving about in classical configuration space, is fixed. Therefore, there is no literal "collapse" or "reduction" in Bohm’s version of orthodox quantum mechanics. What happens in a strong Von Neumann measurement is that the beable system point is trapped by the attractor formed from one of the alternative branches of the wavefunction selected out by the measuring apparatus. All the other branches are still there, but they are empty. They are "inactive information" in Bohm’s terms ready to be resurrected under conditions of quantum erasure and recombination with the occupied branch. Indeed, this is exactly how wave fringes form in the double slit experiment. In contrast, however, when we include back-action from beable to the quantum wavefunction, we are no longer doing orthodox quantum mechanics. This is non-standard or post-modern quantum mechanics. Now the attractors on the fitness landscape can change and bifurcate. Old attractors can change their topological signature or even disappear altogether, new ones can emerge. These kinds of adaptive changes to a changing environment are the defining characteristics for the complex-adaptive system, or elusive "IGUS" (Information Gathering and Utilization System), that Gell-Mann hunted for in the many-worlds, but never really found. In any case, when Stapp writes of "abrupt changes" he does not mean this back-action bifurcation. In fact, from Bohm’s point of view, Stapp, and also Penrose, do not mean anything real at all, but are stuck in an epistemological delusion based on an incorrect way of conceptualizing quantum reality. With this in mind let us continue analysing Stapp’s reality model. :-)

Stapp writes:

"The dynamical evolution of the physical world – as represented by this probability distribution –proceeds by an alternation between two phases: the gradual evolution via deterministic laws analogous to the laws of classical physics is punctuated, at certain times, by sudden uncontrolled quantum jumps, or events." (p.19)

This is also the basic picture of "objective reduction" used by Roger Penrose in his physics of consciousness. The new factor Penrose introduces is "orchestration" which is an incomplete rough approximation to my Bohmian back-action from beable to quantum wave in configuration space. Neither Stapp, nor Penrose, have beables in their theories and that is their fatal flaw. Stapp admits to throwing away the classical world of the beables. Note Bohm and Hiley on the significance of the classical beable world:

"… our interpretation can be shown to contain a classical limit within it which follows in a natural way from the theory itself without the need for any special assumptions. On the other hand, in the conventional interpretation, it is necessary to presuppose a classical level before the quantum theory can have any meaning. The correspondance principle then demonstrates the consistency of the quantum theory with this presupposition. But this does not change the fact that without presupposing a classical level there is no way even to talk about the measuring instruments that are essential in this interpretation to give the quantum theory a meaning." D. Bohm & B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe (Routledge, 1993) p.4

Murray Gell-Mann tries to solve this problem with his "classical histories" variation on the many-worlds paradigm because he is interested in the birth of the universe according to quantum cosmology. But his theory is mathematically inconsistent according to E. J. Squires. Furthermore, it is unnecessary because Bohm and Hiley’s theory is able to give a consistent account of quantum cosmology without needing to assume the existence of either a conscious observer or a measuring instrument "which is not contained in the theory itself". In the Bohm theory "the classical level flows out of the theory itself and does not have to be presupposed from the outside." (p.5, The Undivided Universe)

In contrast, Stapp writes:

"In Heisenberg’s model there is no such classical world. Rather, it is postulated that after the deterministic laws of motion have decomposed the probability distribution into the two well separated branches a ‘detection event’ occurs. This event is a quantum jump, and it actualizes one or the other of these two alternative macroscopic possibilities, and eliminates the other. These Heisenberg events are considered to be the things that ‘actually occur’ in nature: they are actual happenings, and they determine, by the selections they actualize, the course of physical events." (p.19)

This is the crux of both Stapp’s and Penrose’s whole thesis. It is an Emperor with no clothes. It is pure Hegelian mysticism of the most obscure kind. Bohm does not need a new postulate here using vague terms like "actualize" and "select" and "quantum jumps". There is a famous remark of Schrodinger’s on those "damn quantum jumps". What happens when we throw out the baby-beable with the bathwater? New Age mysticism --that’s what. :-)

This is Stapp’s defense:

"Heisenberg’s model is structurally simpler than Bohm’s because it does not involve plotting out the intricate motion of a classical world under influence of the nonlocal force." (p.19)

First of all, that’s the way nature is. Those electrons really are moving under the nonlocal and contextual force. We really have no choice. The seamless integration of Bohm’s theory with the classical world really means that Bohm’s theory is the conceptually simpler and more accurate theory. Second, with modern computers, the task of plotting the intricate motion is not as hopeless as it once appeared to be. There will be immense technological advantage to doing so, especially for nano-engineering.

Stapp continues:

"Also, once a Heisenberg detection event occurs the branch of the probability distribution that represents the undetected possibility is eradicated. In Bohm’s model it awkwardly continues to exist."

"Awkwardly" is the wrong word. That it continues to exist is a strength not a weakness for two reasons. First, are the experiments on "quantum erasers" which show that the "empty branch" is really there. Second, in the case of the mind-matter interaction, the empty branches of the macro-wavefunction of the brain-beable represent the contents of the subconscious mind.

"According to Heisenberg’s idea the strength of the ‘tendencies’ for the actualizations of the various alternative possibilities is specified by the (objectively existing) probability distribution itself. This ensures that the predictions of quantum theory will be satisfied.

Heisenberg’s model of physical reality … has three characteristics that are important in what follows: 1. the model postulates the existence in nature of ‘events’, which are identified as the actual happenings in nature." (p 20)

Heisenberg’s "actual events" in Bohm’s theory correspond to the beable being captured in a basin of attraction in configuration space that corresponds to one of the branches, i.e., eigenfunctions, of the measurement observable(s).

2. "Each such event actualizes a large-scale happening; it saves an entire macroscopic pattern of activity, and eradicates the alternatives."

Bohm’s theory also triggers "an entire macroscopic pattern of activity", but in view of the new quantum eraser experiments on what normally would have been considered to be strong Von Neumann measurements, the eradication of the alternatives would seem to be an incorrect prediction of the Heisenberg reality model shooting Stapp’s thesis down entirely. However, Stapp could still argue that the pattern of EPR-entanglement of the measuring apparatus with the environment is not complex enough to qualify for an effective "actualization" in the conditions of quantum eraser experiments. This seems to be cheating because Heisenberg was not aware of Marlan Scully’s quantum eraser phenomenon when he profferd the model that Stapp has seized upon. The situation, at the very least, is problematical. In my view, the quantum eraser experiments are a triumph for the Bohm ontological model of quantum reality.

3. "Such an event can occur only after an intial mechanical phase has constructed the distinct alternative macroscopic possibilities between which the choice is to be made."

So we see that Stapp is forced to use metaphysical terms like "actualize", "tendencies", "select" and "choice". The use of "select" and "choice" is very strange because orthodox quantum mechanics has maximal uncontrollable quantum randomness. Indeed, this is why there is only FTL-influence and not FTL-control as is made clear in the book, The Cosmic Code, by the late Heinz Pagels. So, to bring up a well-known argument of Stapp’s mentor, William James, both the complete determinism of classical mechanics, and the complete indeterminism of orthodox quantum mechanics deny the possibility of any kind of intelligent "selection" or any kind of morally responsible "choice" i.e., "free will". Penrose, at least, introduces, "orchestration" or "orch OR" which is beyond orthodox quantum mechanics to get free-will. This is in rough agreement with my Bohm back-action theory of the mind-brain in which intelligent selection is the result of the co-evolution of the quantum mindscape with the brain-beable in the face of a continual bit-stream of environmental information (i.e., Darwinian natural selection pressures). It is the feedback-control loop between quantum mind and its brain-beable that orders and controls the hitherto uncontrollable orthodox quantum randomness, thus placing the mind-beable complex adapative system "on the edge" between the complete determinism of the classical world and the complete indeterminisim of the orthodox quantum world. Note, Bohm and Hiley show that, even in orthodox quantum mechanics, "the intricate motion of a classical world under influence of the nonlocal force" is generically "chaotic" in the sense of classical mechanics. The numerous published claims that quantum mechanics suppresses classical chaos are misconceived because they are formulated within the Copenhagen interpretation in which there are no beables. Therefore, they are looking in the wrong place and are asking the wrong question like the learned scholars with the strong light in the famous Sufi tale. Indeed, Penrose makes this error in one of his two popular books.

"In real systems with many particles and complicated potentials, there will be many such bifurcation points, implying something close to chaotic motion. (p.78), Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe.

Stapp then writes:

"The model of the mind/brain to be introduced here is based on the physical similarity between brains and measuring devices. Certain Heisenberg events that actualize large-scale patterns of neuronal activity in human brains will be identified as the physical correlates of human conscious events." (p.20)

OK, this is a new postulate. It corresponds to my postulate that a human conscious event, i.e., experiencing an individual "quale" out of a set of "qualia", happens when the brain-beable system point in configuration space is in the basin of attraction that is the internal representation of that quale. Each quale is the basin of attraction in the Q-mindscape that matches some eigenfunction-branch of the brain-observable(s) that define the decomposition of the quantum wave function of the brain. The "fitness landscape" of Gell-Mann’s "Information Gathering Utilization System" is the Bohm quantum potential Q, plus any external classical potentials V and other external nonconservative forces that act on the brain-beable. Here we see that we do not want the unactualized branches to disappear as it does in Stapp’s model. The unactualized, or more accurately, the empty unoccupied branches are all the other qualia forming the subconscious mind. The spotlight of conscious attention is the actual coincidence of the brain-beable path in configuration space with a branch-attractor. My theory has the added feature of back-action which means that the fitness landscape, i.e., Q-mindscape, of qualia attractors is co-evolving , mutating and bifurcating with the path of the same brain-beable it exerts the nonlocal force on. Both the conscious and subconscious mind are therefore modified by the several kinds of forces, both internal and external, on the brain-beable. Stapp’s theory, restricted to orthodox quantum mechanics, does not have this mind back-action dynamic.

Stapp continues:

"The critical condition for such an identification is that the two correlated events (i.e., the physical event in the brain and the psychic event in the mental world) be images of each other under a mathematical isomorphism … This isomorphism maps conscious events in a psychological realm to corresponding Heisenberg events in a physicist’s description of a brain." (p.20)

My theory automatically satisfies Stapp’s "critical condition" because the "psychic events in the mental world" consist of the coincidence of the brain-beable with a basin of attraction on the ontological Q-mindscape. The co-evolution of mindscape with brain-beable due to the nonlocal force of mindscape on beable, complemented by the direct back-action of beable on mindscape, ensure the requisite "isomorphism". In contrast, Stapp has no brain-beable, so what is he really talking about? He has to introduce some new mental realm beyond physics because his "brain" is the objective probability distribution which is my "mind". My theory is much simpler with fewer adhoc postulates and considerably less "excess metaphysical baggage". Furthermore it is testable.

In 1.8 "The Cognitive Revolution", Stapp mentions "cognitive", i.e., thoughtlike processes implemented in computers "using internal representations of things external … The brain could thus be imagined to be analogous to a computer … But the connection between cognition and consciousness was left unresolved …. and ‘mental’ came to mean cognitve rather than conscious … However, our concern is with consciousness." (p.21)

Indeed, let me be clear that, like Stapp, I need to make a postulate connecting a physical structure in post-modern quantum mechanics with psychic events, i.e., qualia. My postulate is that the quantum pilot-wave whose domain is classical configuration space, and whose range is the complex plane, is intrinsically, or "fundamentally" potentially sentient in the sense that David Chalmers described in his Scientific American article of December, 1995. This potential is actualized when the quantum pilot-wave is protected against thermal decoherence so that back-action automatically kicks in to self-organize the quantum system into an adaptive Information Gathering Utilization System. The back-action is actually a universal dissipative mechanism that springs from the quantum-gravity level as computed by Dimitri Nanopoulos. This is not the same as the E = h/T criterion suggested by Roger Penrose for "orch OR" self-collapse. In fact, Nanopoulos says that Penrose is wrong on this. Bohm in Hiley in 14.6 of The Undivided Universe show how the Nanopoulos term (formally identical to the "GRW" term) is a consequence of back-action in the sense I have defined it above, i.e., as the direct dependence of the pilot-wave on the path of its beable in configuration space. With this postulate, one can simply say that the attractors on the Q-mindscape are the "qualia".

My theory and Stapp’s theory are both dualist. However, there is an essential qualitative difference between them. Stapp has no classical world of beables. His fundamental quantum structure is his ontological probability distribution. This is his "brain", but my "mind". I am not sure, at this point, what his "mind" is, but I suspect that is where he must bring in his metaphysics from Alfred North Whitehead on the "occasions of experience". The occasion of experience in my theory is the coincidence of the brain-beable with a definite attractor on the Q-mindscape. I do not need any metaphysical mental arena for psychic events the way Stapp does. Stapp, in 1.9 describe Daniel Dennett’s refutation of dualism in his book, Consciousness Explained. Let’s first look at Dennett’s definition of "dualism".

"The idea of mind as distinct … from the brain, composed not of ordinary matter but of some other, special kind of stuff, is dualism…"

Well we must look at Dennett’s definition from the perspective of Stapp’s theory and then from mine. First, in Stapp’s theory there is no such thing as "ordinary matter". That’s the "beable" missing from Stapp’s theory. Stapp’s ontological quantum probability distribution (i.e., the Wigner phase space distribution) is all Stapp has that can possibly correspond to Dennett’s "ordinary matter". So, Stapp’s theory is "dualist" in Dennett’s sense as Stapp has to introduce something non-physical beyond the quantum probability distribution. In contrast, my theory is not "dualist" in Dennett’s strict sense because the brain-beable is "ordinary matter" in Dennett’s sense. My "mind" is not any "special kind of stuff", but is simply the quantum wave function which is quite physical. Of course, Dennett is quite wrong because the physical model he uses is obviously Marxist from the Nineteenth Century and is hopelessly outdated. In fact what he says is quite naïve and quaint from any modern physicist’s point of view. Thus Dennett writes:

"The prevailing wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is materialism: there is one sort of stuff, namely matter – the physical stuff of physics, chemistry, and physiology – and the mind is somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon. In short, the mind is the brain."

Dennett’s amazing remark garbles many significant differences into one simplistic slogan. In my post-modern quantum theory, it is true that the mind is "nothing but a physical phenomenon", but there are many important distinctions that need to be made that Dennett rides roughshod over. My theory is not dualist in the Cartesian sense, but it is dualist in the physical sense of Bohm’s hidden-variable theory in which there is a clear distinction between the pilot-wave and the beable. Both are physical, but the pilot-wave is "idea-like" and the beable is "rock-like" – to use Stapp’s terms at the beginning of his book. Actually all rock-like things are stabilized by idea-like things. This is the Pauli exclusion principle in rough pop terms.

Refutation of Gilbert Ryle's nonsense in the next installment. All these philosophers muddling things are like sitting ducks. :-)

Stapp also describes Gilbert Ryle’s usage of the terms "category error", "ghost in the machine" and "humunculi". Ryle seems to say that any possible physical theory of mind is a category error leading to "infinite regress". (p. 21) Stapp quotes William James who wrote:

"The consciousness of Self involves a stream of thought….."

This stream is the sequence of attractors that the beable moves through. Again the mindscape of attractors may or may not be robust relative to the motion of the beable. The mindscape is modifying the path of the beable in addition to external sensory forces, and the path, in turn is modifying the mindscape, but not necessarily in an "equal and opposite" way as in Newton’s third law.

"each part of which as "I" can (1) remember those that went before, and know the things they knew;…"

The memory is encoded in the shape of the mindscape parts of which are robust. The memory is reawakened when the beable moves into its basin of attraction. That’s why we do not want all the branches of the wavefunction destroyed, as they are in Stapp’s theory, because that’s where memories are stored in the subconscious mind. The entire global mindscape is important. Indeed, the "Self" is the information imprinted in the total mindscape hypersurface in the configuration space of the brain-beable.

"and (2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among them as ‘me’, and appropriate to these the rest… This me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The I that knows them cannot itself be an aggregate. Neither … need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul…"

Since back-action makes the total mindscape of the brain into a dynamic pattern, it is not unchanging as it would be in orthodox quantum mechanics for fixed boundary conditions. I think Stapp wants the make the boundary conditions the only source of change without back-action. Or, if he uses back-action, like he did in his July 15, 1994 Phys Rev A paper (p. 18) which modeled Helmut Schmidt’s "retro-PK" data, it would only be for anomalous psi phenomena because of the FTL-control overriding the Eberhard-Stapp theorem. However, the main problem with Stapp’s theory is, again, he has no-brain beable. He has no path of the brain through the configuration space of its relevant parts.

"…or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as ‘out of time’. It is a Thought, at each moment different from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own … thought itself is the thinker, and psychology need not look beyond." (p.22)

The phrase "thought itself is the thinker" is a nice way of describing the self-organizing co-evolution of the Q-mindscape and its brain-beable in which the momentary awareness of I is simply the coincidence of the brain-beable with a particular attractor in the dynamically shifting mindscape. The mindscape and its beable are Gell-Mann’s Information Gathering Utilization System. Not only psychology, but physics also "need not look beyond" to any Whiteheadian metaphysical realm of the psyche. Since Stapp threw away the brain beable, and misnamed "mind" as "as the physicist’s brain", he needs something beyond physics to replace it. In contrast, I do not need to go beyond physics to solve the mind-matter mystery. Stapp’s great mistake was to "dispense with Bohm’s classical world" (p.19) and to assume that the quantum probability distribution, which forms my "mindscape", is "the complete representation of physical reality". Stapp, and Penrose for that matter, have not been able to escape from Bohr’s mystical delusion that the classical material world is some kind of an illusion at the fundamental level of quantum reality.

However, my model, like Stapp’s, avoids Ryle’s "infinite regress" and his "humunculi" on the Cartesian stage because I also need not posit a "knower that stands behind the thoughts themselves". (p.22) The inseparable mindscape-beable is sufficient unto itself to account for the experience of qualia as the conjunction of beable with attractor in the mindscape. "The thought and doing are two aspects of a single event." (p22) in my theory as well as Stapp’s. The important difference between our models is that Stapp needs to go beyond physics to get to his "mind" in his particular dualism. That is, Stapp’s second dynamic of the "punctuation" by "sudden uncontrolled quantum jumps or events" (p.19) which is von Neumann’s projection postulate is what I mean by going "beyond physics" to metaphysics. Stapp tries to make a virtue out of an ugly vice. Also I do not see how he can get intention or free will out of "uncontrolled" quantum jumps. Control is vital to purposive intent.

Stapp opposes the "ghost in the machine" image with the Jamesian "the thought is the thinker" image. But in Bohm’s picture the two images are quite compatible. The ghost or "soul" in the classical beable machine is simply the quantum-mindscape. But the mindscape and the beable are tightly coupled by back-action into a single inseparable complex adaptive system, or IGUS, in which the experience of the thought is the capture of the beable by an attractor region of the mindscape made from all of the branches of the wavefunction. In ordinary quantum mechanics, the spectra of the observables in Hilbert space are rigid, not so in the back-action extension where the spectra morph with eigenfunction-dimensions being created and destroyed with the motion of the beable in configuration space. The post-modern quantum dynamic is essentially non-unitary. The rigid Hilbert space structure of orthodox quantum mechanics can be compared to the rigid flat spacetime of special relativity which admits global inertial frames. The malleable morphing Hilbert space structure of the back-action extension must then be compared to general relativity with its variable spacetime curvature, its replacement of the global inertial frame with local inertial frames, and its restoration of a preferred non-inertial global frame of absolute rest. This absolute rest is defined by the Hubble flow of our actual expanding universe in the presence of the cosmic blackbody radiation left over from the big bang explosion that created real time from Hawking’s imaginary time.

Dennett refuted. In 1.10 (p.23) Stapp cites Dennett who explains "What, then is so wrong with dualism? Why is it in such disfavor?" Dennett answers: "A fundamental principle of physics is that any change in the trajectory of a particle is an acceleration requiring the expenditure of energy .. this principle of conservation of energy .. is apparently violated by dualism. This confrontation between quite standard physics and dualism … is widely regarded as the inescapable flaw of dualism."

While this may be the case for the quaint Cartesian dualism of the Victorian British Society for Psychic Research, it does not at all apply to my physical dualism based on Bohm’s physics which obeys the principle of conservation of energy. All the conservation laws are obeyed.

Dennett uses the words "what happens there is what you are conscious of". That’s fine, since, in my theory the coincidence of a classical beable in an attractor in the quantum mindscape is "what happens there" and "what you are conscious of". This is, of course, a postulate. Any physical theory of consciousness needs to make an equivalent postulate somewhere. Indeed, I need fewer postulates than Stapp does, so I get more with less relative to Stapp, and Penrose too for that matter.

You can say, that the co-evolution of quantum mindscape with classical brain beable is precisely Dennett’s "central [but material] Theater where ‘it all comes together’ ... because what happens there is what you are conscious of." However, there is the physical dualism between quantum mindscape and classical beable within this self-organizing "Theater". Dennett tries unsuccessfully IMHO to refute this Theater model that he sets up as a Straw Man. He replaces it with a "multiple drafts" model. Dennett cites an experiment of Kolers and Gunau that suggests the same kind of "timing inversion", suggesting either precognition or retroactive psychokinesis, seen in Libet’s very different brainwave experiments showing "subjective delay" discussed by Roger Penrose. Stapp also cites "Grey Walter’s precognitive carousel" (p.25). Dennett asks "How are we able …. To fill in the spot at the intervening place-times along a path running from the first to the second flash before that second flash occurs?" Stapp writes: "This timing inversion is difficult to reconcile to the Cartesian Theater model of mind and brain." This is no problem in my theory because back-action, beyond orthodox quantum mechanics, permits both precognition and retroactive psychokinesis which are two consequences of FTL-control. (p.24) Dennett postulates "multiple channels in which specialist circuits try, in parallel pandemoniums, to do their various things". Of course, this is just metaphorical imagery having no clear connection to laws of physics. At best it is romantic top-down functional phenomenology, not the kind of bottom-up physics-based testable theory that Stapp, Penrose and I are attempting to develop. Dennett rejects the notion of a single stream of consciousness. There is nothing in my theory that demands a single stream since the beable system point is a very complex structure with substructures in which consciousness can split on different levels. I agree with Stapp’s conclusion about Dennett’s entertaining sophistry and rhetoric which is not a serious theory of consciousness: "That argument is not logically sound: the absence of a central place where order of arrival equals order of presentation does not logically entail that there can be no stream of complex unified thoughts of the kind we seem to have." (p.25) Dennett is simply clowning. His theory of "multiple-drafts" is what Feynman called "cargo-cult".

Stapp defines the "fundamental problem" for William James (p.25) that are "strictly within themselves, without the help of some outside binding agent" complex wholes within a reductionist framework in which "everything is … nothing but an aggregation of simple parts. While that is impossible, Bohm’s theory of the beable moving under the influence of the nonlocal contextual quantum potential Q, in addition to external forces, is a coherent visualizable theory of organic complex wholes that clearly shows the limits of the purely classical reductionist framework. Stapp tries to accomplish this objective using vague metaphysical "Heisenberg events". Therefore, his brilliant theory of consciousness is built on foundations of sand.

Stapp’s Brain Dynamics:

" .. in the brain a huge number of separate patterns of neural excitations can be present at one time. These patterns can become correlated to stimuli and responses, and can mediate the behavior of the organism … the structure of of these neural patterns can form representations of the body and its environment, with a history of the occurring representations becoming stored in memory." (p.25)

First of all the neural excitations are classical not quantum mechanical. In my theory their role is the interface or transducer between the classical and quantum levels. The electrical neural pattern is input information to the biocomputing switching-array of electrons whose dipole displacements form the pumped Frohlich collective modes. These electrons, protected against thermal decoherence in the manner described by Hameroff and others, control the conformation of the protein dimers which, in turn, couple back to the neural excitations. So there is a clear classical electromagnetic, and possibly chemical, feedback-control loop between the Frohlich electric dipole modes and the neural patterns. So far there is no quantum connection. The methods of classical neuroscience and classical molecular biology operate at this top level pretty accurately. Now lets go down to the nanometer level. The thermally protected control electrons forming the Frohlich modes are the brain-beables. It is their giant quantum potential Q which forms the mindscape whose attractors are the qualia. It is this second quantum feedback-control loop that I have been talking about in this paper. It is the switching network of these electrons and their pilot-wave that is Gell-Mann’s Information Gathering Utilization System. The role of the classical neural excitations is simply that of a communication channel bringing Darwinian natural selection forces into the self-referential complex adaptive system of this electronic switching network and its Q-mindscape. It is this nonlocal context-dependent Q-mindscape that is the important "internal representation" of qualia.

Stapp continues with his brain model:

"The main postulate of the model is that every conscious event is the psychological counterpart of a certain special kind of Heisenberg event in the brain, namely an event that actualizes a pattern of neuronal activity that consitutes a representation of this general kind." (p.25)

The "conscious event" in my theory happens when the brain-beable is in the basin of attraction of the quale that is the content of the conscious event. This attractor does exert a definite nonlocal pattern of quantum forces all over the brain and beyond which modify the neural excitation pattern. Therefore, it does agree in a qualitative way with the essential core of Stapp’s idea. It does not require, however, Stapp’s metaphysical notion of "a certain special kind of Heisenberg event", which, in my theory, is a redundant concept.

"However, any such representation must be formed before it can be selected."

Stapp’s "representation" is in the neural pattern, mine is in the quantum mindscape, i.e., the equipotential surfaces of Q. My quantum representation is automatically formed in the coevolution of the brain-beable with the mindscape under the influence of external electromagnetic forces from the classical neural excitation pattern.

"the representation must be constructed by unconscious brain activity…"

"governed by the preceding mechanical phase of dynamical evolution, before it can be actualized."

This is standard Copenhagen in which the "mechanical phase" is the unitary evolution of the quantum wavefunction of the closed system between strong Von Neumann measurements. The actualization is what I have called the adhoc "metaphysical" notion of "collapse" or "uncontrolled reduction" that Penrose calls "R". This idea was first introduced by Von Neumann. However, the brain is not a closed system. The strong measurement is not the only kind of measurement that may be important in the mind-brain Information Gathering Utilization System. There are also Aharonov’s "weak measurements" that may be going on. Finally, in Bohm’s theory the metaphysical collapse is an illusion. In my theory, the "unactualized", i.e., unoccupied by the beable, ontological branches of the wave function are serving the important function of storing subconscious memories.

"During this preliminary mechanical phase a superposition of many such representations must inevitably be generated. During the subsequent actualization phase one of these representations will be selected."

In the Bohm theory, the superposition corresponds to the beable being in the overlap region of several attractors on the Q-fitness landscape i.e., "mindscape". The "actualization" of one of these representations corresponds to the beable moving into the hard core of the basin of attraction of only one of the attractors. So my "attractor" corresponds to Stapp’s "representation". Furthermore, unlike Stapp’s restriction to orthodox quantum mechanics, in my back-action theory the shape, topology and even continued existence of any given attractor is not fixed. Indeed, totally new attractors can come into being. This is creative thought. There is no possibility for creative thought in Stapp’s theory because he restricts it to orthodox quantum mechanics.

This is trivially the case in my theory because the classical neural patterns transfer information to the quantum-computing electron switches via the tight coupling of the latter to the protein dimers as explained, more or less, by Hameroff. That is the first stage. The second stage involves back-action. The information from the neural excitations (and chemical messenger molecules) encoded spatially in the array of dimer "open"/"closed" configurations, is imprinted via direct back-action (made possible by protection against thermal decoherence), on the Q-mindscape of the electron-switching network beable. That is the new environmental patterns transduced from neural excitations to electrons, via the microtubule architecture, modify the shape, topological signature, and even bifurcate the initial attractor that stores the quale by its very structure. The Q-mindscape is fundamentally sentient in Chalmer’s sense, and this is the key postulate of my theory. It identifies a clear physical structure with "mind" without the need to invoke any romantic metaphors, like Dennett et-al do, or any metaphysics like Stapp and Penrose do. Therefore, since the conscious event is experienced as a quale when the beable, for the "enchanted web" of electron switches, is in the region of configuration space controlled by the attractor, Stapp’s remark is obviously satisified in my model in a particularly clear way that is easy to visualize.

"The final patterns are essentially global, relative to the brain." (p.26) This remark of Stapp’s is also trivially true in my model, because the fundamental arena for the mind/brain interaction, in my theory, is the very same classical configuration space of chaos and complexity theory already used in a phenomenological top-down way by mathematical biologists, neural network theorists et-al . The difference is that I have derived the relevance of this configuration space directly from Bohm’s nonrelativistic nonlocal hidden-variable theory. The beable system point, local in configuration space, is highly nonlocal in physical spacetime. Different subspaces of configuration space correspond to electron quantum computing switches at widely separated locations all over the brain and beyond. The nonlocality and context-dependence of Bohm’s quantum potential Q is the sentient quantum glue beyond spacetime that holds it all together in a globally coherent way. The "binding problem" is trivially explained. In fact, all the "hard problems" of classical consciousness theory are trivially explained in my Bohmian theory. In contrast, both Stapp’s and Penrose’s theories have an uncomfortable vagueness at their core because of Bohr’s false metaphysical dogma that individual quantum processes cannot be visualized in detail. Finally, it must be noted for the record that Hameroff naively and irrationally protests that only spacetime is real, and configuration space is not. Therefore, he says, my theory is at best only a "cheap imitation" of Penrose’s. This is obviously a defensive reaction in a rear guard action, as he cannot but help see the handwriting on the wall. :-)

"A conscious event actualizes only a fully constructed and coherent representation of the ‘evolving self-and suroundings’, after it has been formed by unconscious processes."

The mindscape and the brain beable are in continuous interdependent co-evolution. The experience of consciousness changes with the changing position of the beable in the shifting mindscape. Stapp pictures "the conscious event" as "the image in a psychological realm of a special kind of Heisenberg event in the brain". This is rather vague in comparison with the definite theoretical structures of Q-mindscape and beable in the configuration space of classical chaos theory that I use that are parts of physics and not beyond it in the metaphysical realm. What precisely is "the psychological realm" and "the Heisenberg event"? Stapp tries to explain the Heisenberg event in terms of the Schrodinger Cat thought-experiment in orthodox quantum mechanics for closed systems. He does introduce the idea of self-measurement saying

".. if the man then observes himself, and a detection event occurs, then one of the two alternative possibilities will be selected, and the other will disappear from the realm of possibilities."

Though not an objection to Stapp’s theory, I note that in the "many-mind’s" variation of the many-worlds interpretation that is advocated by Gell-Mann, Lockwood, Hawking and many others, David Albert shows that self-measurement in Schrodinger Cat situations allows cross-communication between the minds in parallel worlds. The two mind-clones can "photograph" each other (e.g., Ch 6, Quantum Mechanics and Experience).

"The sensing event than actualizes, in the brain, one or the other of these two representations."

Stapp keeps having to introduced new metaphoric ideas like "sensing event" to explain his elusive theory which is not a good sign.

"The associated experience is an image of this representation."

In my theory, the one postulate beyond physics I need to make, remember Stapp makes many postulates beyond physics, is that the coincidence of brain-beable with a mindscape attractor is the conscious experience. The other qualia-attractors do not disappear in my theory as they do in Stapp’s theory. They remain as "inactive information" in the subconscious mind ready to be reawakened if the brain-beable wanders into their basins of attraction. This is exactly what happens in the creation of fringes in the double slit experiment where the beable really does pass through only one slit, but its pilot-wave passes through both slits. The beable can be under the influence of several attractors simultaneously. This happens in dreaming and in altered states of consciousness. Artists, poets, musicians, and wacko physicists like me :-) are in this state most of the time. It’s called "the right brain" mode. I don’t particularly like that characterization which is a simplistic premature extrapolation from primitive EEG brain-wave studies along the lines of Francis Crick’s unastonishing hypothesis. Crick was very good in getting the spatial shape of the DNA molecule, but he is not so good in trying to explain consciousness as a classical phenomenon entirely in spacetime. Hameroff also makes this fundamental error.

Now we come to the heart of the matter which I think is the really weak link in Stapp’s elaborate chain of reasoning - - free will or intention. I think orthodox quantum mechanics cannot properly explain intention because of the uncontrollable quantum randomness. Stapp appears to think otherwise -- or does he?

"This Heisenberg event actualizes precisely the sort of entity that is needed to guide effective action." (p.27)

Is this "wishing will make it so"? How exactly does this guiding happen? I explain this guiding as the feedback-control loop between the mindscape and its brain-beable made possible by the back-action beyond the orthodox quantum mechanics that Stapp hangs on to. I spent many fruitless years trying to get faster-than-light communication (i.e., FTL-control) using quantum nonlocality within orthodox quantum mechanics. It was Stapp who told me this could not be done and he was right. But now he is making a similar mistake trying to explain free will within orthodox quantum mechanics.

Stapp then describes Grey Walter’s "precognitive carousal" brain experiment which is really a variation on Libet’s time-reversal experiment.

"The subjects reported that just as they were about to push the button, but before they had actually decided to do so, the projector would advance the slide’." (p.27)

Stapp attempts an explanation based upon the common sense principle of retarded causality which says that causes are always in the past of their effects. This is consistent with his use of orthodox quantum mechanics which obeys the Eberhard-Stapp theorem forbidding FTL-control. Any kind of violation of retarded causality requires FTL-control and is beyond orthodox theory. My back-action theory has FTL-control which opens the possibility that these various time-reversal brain experiments are really evidence for FTL-control in which effects can be in the past of their causes. The back-action permits FTL-control. Without FTL-control, there is no possibility for morally responsible free-will under the short time scales of these time-reversal brain experiments. Indeed, Penrose, raises this "teleological" possible explanation of Libet’s time-reversal brain experiment in his book, The Emperor’s New Mind.

Common ground: I have been emphasizing significant differences between, Stapp, Penrose’s and my theory of the physics of the mind-matter interaction. There are also significant similarities which should be mentioned for a balanced perspective. Thus, Stapp wrote about himself and Penrose:

"The central theme of both works is that the emergence of consciousness in association with brain processes is closely tied up with the quantum character of physical reality." (p.28)

"To physicists who have long wrestled with the fundamental questions in quantum theory this ‘globality’ of conscious thoughts is reminiscent of the ‘globality’ of conscious states. ....The ‘globality’ of quantum states is revealed most strikingly in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox ... Penrose correctly stresses ... that this paradox is not similar to the correlations between distant events that are understandable in the frame work of ordinary classical ideas ... In that classical way of thinking you can contemplate a situation in which two balls are shot out in opposite directions from a central region, and in which you know that one of the balls is white and the other is black. If you then find out that the ball appearing in your vicinity is white you can immediately infer that the ball appearing in the other vicinity is black. There is no puzzle or paradox in any of this. The EPR situation is quite different. There the combined system of two far-apart particles acts as a single global entity, in the sense that it is not possible to impose the following causality requirement: What a scientist decides to do to one part of a system cannot affect in any way how the system will respond at the same instant to a measurement performed upon it far away. .... What you do to it in one place can influence how it will react to a simultaneous probing far away." (p.30)

This is common ground for all our theories. Note, that free will, i.e., "What a scientist decides to do…" requires faster-than-light (FTL) influence within orthodox quantum mechanics. I also argue that it requires FTL-control, or "communication", beyond orthodox quantum mechanics.

Stapp then cites Penrose who wrote:

"I am speculating that the action of conscious thinking is very much tied up with the resolving out of alternatives that were previously in linear superposition. This is all concerned with the unknown physics that governs the borderline between U and R."

U is the smooth "unitary" evolution of the quantum wave function of a closed system between the particular external perturbations called "strong" Von Neumann measurements where probability is conserved. R is the abrupt metaphysical "collapse" or "reduction" process that is, in the Copenhagen interpretation, "nonunitary" where probability is not conserved within the initial system. I want to emphasize, that the R of orthodox quantum theory is uncontrollably random, completely indeterministic "quantum jumps", subject to the Born probability algorithm. It is obviously impossible to have free will if there is no possibility of control of the relevant physical processes. Not recognizing this fully is the source of a fundamental flaw in Stapp’s logic IMHO. Indeed, to his credit, Stapp makes the candid admission:

"The deep questions why the jumps occur at this level, and which of the allowed possibilities is actually chosen in any individual quantum event, are not addressed here: the present form of the proposed quantum theory of the mind/brain interface – like the present orthodox quantum theory of matter – does not seek to answer either of these deep and still unresolved questions. " (p.32).

Thus, Stapp does not really deliver on the promise inherent in the title of his book. One begins to wonder why he wrote the book. Penrose does make a stab at these questions, and I have a very precise qualitative answer to them in the quantum mindscape/classical brain-beable back-action theory.

I have already indicated that Yakir Aharonov has recently discovered a whole new classes of "weak" and "protected" measurements. Therefore, the foundation of both Stapp’s and Penrose’s theories are based upn a very limited vision of the full scope of quantum measurement alternatives. Furthermore, all living systems are open to environmental transfers of energy, matter and entropy (information). Therefore, to use U for living matter is highly questionable. Furthermore, the most well developed extension of quantum mechanics, beyond the orthodox theory, is that of Dimitri Nanopoulos. In his theory, all quantum systems at small biological energies are fundamentally open. The openness comes from two different mechanisms. The first is the ordinary environmental couplings to the thermalized environment that I just mentioned. However, this thermal coupling can be shielded out. Indeed, in my theory a universal necessary, though not sufficient, condition for all forms of life is a thermal shield at the nanometer-scale of the general "Eccles gate" which is the physical interface or "substrate" between the Q-mindscape and the brain-beable. For example, I speculate that our Eccles gate is the EPR correlated system of electron two-state non-Boolean quantum switches that control the relatively large nanoscale protein dimer spatial configurations in microtubules as described by Hameroff. It is the electric dipole moments of these electrons which make the collective Frohlich modes on the microtubule surfaces. But we can imagine other human-engineered Eccle’s gates in, for example, silicon chips, superfluid helium and superconductors which would spawn new forms of aritifical, but naturally conscious, life. The second mechanism is from the ultra-high energy scale of superstrings and quantum gravity fluctuations in the classical geometry of spacetime. Nanopoulos makes qualitative contact with an idea of Penrose here but the details of their theories differ profoundly. Nanopoulos shows that these ultra-high energy effects leave a tiny residue in our low energy world of chemistry and biology. There is a fundamental unshieldable "quantum friction" in every low energy system which is very tiny for small numbers of interacting particles, but which gets stronger as the number N of interacting particles increases. The Q-mindscape/brain-beable complex adaptive IGUS is able to work like an ultra-powerful quantum computer up until the quantum friction halts the computation with decoherence. This assumes that the thermal shield is "up". Think of the Star Ship Enterprise as the mindscape-beable system, with its force shield as the thermal shield. A breakdown of the thermal shield protecting the Eccles gates results in the death of the organism. This explains why orthodox quantum mechanics works so well in the classic experiments all of which involve statistical ensembles who basic members are simple not large complex systems. Many of out biophysical probes like X-rays, PET scans, and nuclear magnetic resonance imaging, probe only the simple levels of our living body and totally miss the more subtle higher-level collective modes that form the brain-beable of our consciousness.

In summary, I do strongly agree with Penrose’s remark that "the resolving out of alternatives is all concerned with the unknown physics that governs the borderline between U and R." Indeed, Penrose proposes "orch OR", or "orchestration", "self-collapse" with "single-graviton emission" as the really new physics here beyond orthodox quantum mechanics. Penrose, is able, but Stapp is apparently not able, to see, like I can, that the uncontrollable randomness of R precludes the intelligent control required for the intentional, or purposeful "resolving out of the alternatives" for taking morally responsible freely-willed action. My back-action theory easily explains this purposeful resolution of alternatives as an obvious consequence of the co-evolutionary feedback-control loop of the Q-mindscape with the brain-beable.My theory is "Jamesian mind" in Stapp’s sense where "the thought is itself the thinker". My theory does not demand the Cartesian "humuculus", or "Ego", or "witness", or "audience", or "Central Executive, or "Central Meaner" (p.23) so it is not subject to Dennett’s and Ryle’s objections. There is no non-physical "ghost in the machine", but there is a very physical "quantum soul of the machine", i.e., the Q-mindscape of qualia with a precise mathematical structure. There is no violation of any physical conservation law. There is no destruction of "alternatives" under some miraculous metaphysical "R", or even "orch OR". The conscious experience automatically occurs as an inseparable totally physical mind-brain whole phenomenon when the beable is coincident with a definite quale-attractor in the mindscape. The fundamental arena is the configuration space of classical chaos theory which is highly global and nonlocal in ordinary spacetime. Therefore, it immediately explains the "binding problem" in terms of quantum nonlocality. Thus, Stapp wrote:

"One of Penrose's main reasons for believing that the quantum character of reality is essential to the occurrence of consciousness is the shared ‘global’ character of conscious thoughts and quantum states. … a thought seems to grasp an entire complex whole …" (p29).

This idea is common to all our theories. In my theory, this is trivially true because the "entire complex whole" is the precise shape of the attractor at the moment that the brain-beable moves into its basin of attraction on the quantum mindscape in classical configuration space. The esthetics of the the experience, its tenor, hue, and feel etc is highly sensitive to the precise coevolving path of the beable through its shifting codependent attractor. Precise thoughts have relatively robust attractors. The passage of one experience into another corresponds to the journey of the brain-beable in the no-mans land in which several attractors overlap. This is the region of quantum interference. Thus, Mozart wrote "I have the entire composition finished in my head though it may be long … my mind seizes it as a glance … It does not come to me successively … but in its entirety that my imagination lets me hear it". In contrast, the disjoint incoherent "word salad" of psychotics, schizophrenics, drunkards, spaced-out New Agers, and undeveloped minds, have highly unstable attractors.

A mathematical appendix on the meaning of back-action: Suppose we have N electron switches. This entire biocomputing network spread all over the brain, and even elsewhere in the body, form a single beable system point in their classical configuration space of a very large number of dimensions proportional to N. Since they are protected against thermal disruptions, they share a giant Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) entangled quantum wave function PSI which is a local function in this classical configuration space. It is, of course, nonlocal in physical space. Let’s take the simplest many-particle problem in which N = 2, for electrons A and B. The EPR pilot-wave is the mathematical function PSI(xA,xB,t) where x refers to the possible position vectors of the electrons and t is the time. There exists a local differential operator in vector calculus called the spatial gradient which I denote simply as the vector grad. This grad operates in the ordinary classical physical space of three dimensions. The PSI function is a complex number having the polar representation PSI = Re^iS. R is the "modulus" of PSI and S is the "phase". The nonlocal contextual "quantum potential" Q of both electrons comes from the Schrodinger equation of orthodox quantum mechanics. Bohm proved that

where hbar is Planck’s universal quantum of classical mechanical action divided by 2pi, m is the mass of the electron biocomputer switch (like a nanoscale transistor), and grad^2 is the scalar grad operator applied twice in a "dot product". This is called "the Laplacian" in vector calculus. The Laplacian operates locally in physical space at the possible position of each electron. Q is "contextual" because it changes when the pilot-wave PSI changes, for whatever reason. The quantum force Fq on electron-beable A, for example, is

There are also classical electromagnetic forces Fem from the neural excitations. Therefore, Newtons’s second law of motion for electron-beable A is simply

Where p is the momentum vector of the beable. There is also, a quantum condition on this beable momentum given, for electron A by

But both Q and S are nonlocal depending on the possible position xB of the second beable electron B. To solve an actual problem, you choose initial conditions xA(0), xB(0) , pA(0), pB(0) and solve the Newtonian equations. For example, one way to see the nonlocality is in the dependence of the path for electron A on changing the initial conditions for electron B and vice versa. However, Q does not just switch off, but continues to act instantly at a distance. The two actual paths for each electron co-evolve self-consistently. Computing this in small time steps is nontrivial. The Q(xA,xB,t) for each t is evaluated at the actual positions XA and XB. One might try to extend this to include a weighted contribution from all past and future positions according to some probability shape factor. But this would be a new kind of superdetermined theory beyond the Bohm theory. Note, that in this orthodox limit of zero back-action, there is no explicit direct dependence of PSI on the actual positions XA and XB.

There is no violation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle for x and p here as a detailed measurement model involving statistical ensembles of beables shows. This explains the fundamental mechanism for the "binding problem" of consciousness theory, because Q is what I have been calling the "mindscape" of qualia. The mindscape in this simple toy model consists of the equipotential surfaces of Q in the configuration space of both electrons. The beable system point is simply the pair of possible position vectors (xA,xB). So far, we have done orthodox quantum mechanics a la Bohm with no back-action. To get back-action we have to introduce the two new actual position vectors XA and XB for electrons A and B as additional independent variables for PSI. This connects with Vitiello’s "time-reversed mirror coordinates" in his "brain dynamics". Therefore, the PSI pilot wave function, is no longer PSI(xA,xB,t) as it is for orthodox quantum mechanics, but it is now Psi(xA,XA,xB,XB,t). Where the potential positions x are simply "field points", while the actual positions X are "source points". In Bohm’s version of orthodox quantum mechanics, the quantum pilot wave is a new kind of nonlocal field in addition to the local classical electromagnetic field. But the classical electromagnetic field has charged sources. In orthodox quantum mechanics the nonlocal pilot-wave field has no source. My back-action theory introduces sources for the nonlocal (in physical space) pilot-wave field. These sources establish the self-organizing feedback-control loop between mindscape and brain-beable that I have been talking about. Furthermore, sections 14.3 and 14.6 of The Undivided Universe, show how these new back-action source points give dissipative density matrix equations of the type derived by Dimitri Nanopoulos using his "superstring brain dynamics" model.

"The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, by itself, makes manifest the need for a radical restructuring of our ideas about the nature of physical reality."

EPR There are strong instantaneous connections over large distances at the quantum level of reality. Two experimenters perform independent measurements on the same extended system at the same time in two well-separated regions of space. Each experimenter can freely choose and then immediately perform --one of two alternative possible measurements on the large system. So we have a pair of measurements one by each experimenter. We have four possible pairs.

Quantum mechanics allows an extended system with the following features. The two alternative measurements are of "color" and "size". Color can be "black" or "white". Size can be "large" or "small".

Quantum mechanics makes four true assertions about this system.

1. Measure size in region 1 with outcome "large". Measure color in region 2. The outcome is certain to be "white". That is, the conditional probability P(1large|2 white) = 1.

2. Measure color in region 2 with outcome "white", then if color is measured in region 1 the outcome is "black" with 100% probability. So, P(1black|2 white) = 1.

3. Measure color in region 1 with outcome "black", then if size is measured in region 2 the outcome is "small" with 100% probability. So, P(1 black|2 small) = 1

4. Measure "size" in both regions, the joint probability that both outcomes are "large" are approximately 1/16. So, P(1 large|2 large) = 1/16.

Assume locality i.e., there is no faster-than-light action at a distance.

Conclusion A. Suppose "size" is measured in region 1 and the outcome there is "large". Then if "color" instead of "size" had been measured in region 1, the outcome there would necessarily have been "black".

Proof of A: Suppose size is measure in 1 with outcome large. Suppose color is measure in region 2 to get white according to prediction 1 above. Given this white in region 2 and locality. So imagine color instead of size measure in region 1. Then according to prediction 2 we must have black in region 1. So we have both large and black in region 1. But by locality it does not matter what measurement was done in region 2. Hence the connection established between results in region 1 cannot be disturbed by changing what we do in region 2. So we have both black and large simultaneously in region 1 and we have violated the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.

Next combine A with prediction 3 to get small in region 2 with 100% probability assuming locality. This violates prediction 4. P.8

"Thus the predictions of quantum theory are logically incompatible with the assertion that the outcome of any measurement performed on one part of a quantum system must be independent of which measurement is performed simultaneously on a faraway part: large quantum systems seem to behave.. as if they were instantaneously linked-up wholes. The entire argument refers only to large visible objects."

The pair state has 4 complex coefficients a,b,c,d i.e. 8 real numbers.

The normalization condition is one equation giving a unit hypersphere whose surface has 7 real dimensions.

We are then given 4 more equations, and one more variable x.

So we have 5 equations and 9 real variables.

Let |psi> be this pair state.

|<1large,2white|psi>|^2 = 1

|<1black,2white|psi>|^2 = 1

|<1black,2small|psi>|^2 = 1

|<1large,2large|psi>|^2 = 1/16

Make the frame transformation in Hilbert space:

|large> = cosx |black> + sinx |white>

|small> = -sinx |black> + cosx |white>

In general

|psi> = a|1black>|2 black> + b|1black>|2 white> + c|1white>|2 black> + d|1white>|2 white>

Where conservation of probability implies

|a|^2 + |b|^2 + |c|^2 + |d|^2 = 1

So that

<1large|<2 large| = (cosx)^2 <1black|<2 black| + (sinx)^2 <1 white|<2 white| + sinx cosx (<1 white|<2 black| + <1 black|<2 white|)

Therefore,

|<1 large|2 large|psi>| = |a (cosx)^2 + (b + c) sinx cosx + d (sinx)^2| = ¼

Similarly we get 3 other conditions. So we have 5 real equations for 9 real variables since a,b, c and d are complex. I will finish this later.

MAIN MENU